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The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966' was a
revolutionary statute. Indeed, it represented the convergence of two revo-
lutionary movements. The first was the political movement for reform of
federal administrative regulation.2 Abandoning the New Deal model of a
reactive regulatory commission charged with adjudicating, on a case-by-
case basis, the reasonableness of the activities of particular firms, the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act created a "pro-active" bu-
reau charged with the responsibility for promulgating new general rules
of conduct that would operate industry-wide. The second revolutionary
movement was intellectual and reshaped the substance of automobile
safety regulation.' Abandoning the historic definition of the automobile
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1. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(1966) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982 & Supp. I 1985)) [hereinafter "Act"
or "Safety Act").
2. For a contemporary argument in favor of broader administrative rulemaking authority see Sha-
piro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78
HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965) (suggesting that greater rulemaking authority would allow agencies to
develop policy in a more coherent and forthright fashion). See also R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND
THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 5-9 (1983) (describing "new regulation" in gen-
eral terms); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1804, 1811 (1978) (noting that "burdens of trial-type hearings . . . led . . . federal agencies to
turn from case-by-case adjudication to general rulemaking proceedings in order to develop administra-
tive policy").
3. For early pronouncements of the new perspective, see ACCIDENT RESEARCH: METHODS AND
APPROACHES (W. Haddon, E. Suchman & D. Klein ed. 1964) [hereinafter ACCIDENT RESEARCHI;
Gordon, The Epidemiology of Accidents, 39 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 504 (1949) (accidents conform to
same biological laws as disease).
Haddon, a Harvard-trained M.D. with a master's degree in public health, was the agency's first
administrator and a leading proponent of the new science of accidents. In a series of scholarly publica-
tions, Haddon elucidated an etiology of accidental trauma that pictured accidents as a public health
phenomenon which could be controlled by the same techniques that were applied to other
"epidemics".
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safety problem as one of avoiding accidents by modifying driver behavior,
the 1966 Act adopted an epidemiological perspective. Reconstituted, the
safety issue became how to modify the vehicle (environment) so that the
interaction of the passenger (host) and the deceleration forces of accidents
(agent) produced less trauma.4
A review of ACCIDENT RESEARCH came to Senator Ribicoff's attention and reportedly influenced
his call for traffic safety hearings in 1965. Federal Role in Traffic Safety: Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., Ist
& 2d Sess. (1965-1966). Ribicoff was a freshman Senator who arrived in Washington with a reputa-
tion as "Mr. Safety," due to an aggressive but ineffectual campaign against speeding which he had
overseen as Governor of Connecticut. Haddon's focus on passive protection, in particular vehicle rede-
sign, as an alternative to driver modification strongly appealed to Ribicoff. The initial congressional
hearings conducted by Ribicoff set in motion a competition among politicians on various committees to
determine who could produce the strongest safety legislation. See Drew, The Politics of Auto Safety,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1966, at 95.
For a more recent review of the intellectual history of the science of accidents, and, in particular,
Haddon's contributions to the reconceptualization of accidents from an epidemiological perspective,
see Haddon, Advances in the Epidemiology of Injuries as a Basis for Public Policy, 95 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 411, 412-18 (1980).
4. Legislative history demonstrates that Congress appreciated that the Act represented a major
shift away from a focus on driver error to a greater concern for vehicle crashworthiness. Senator
Ribicoff articulated the rationale for safety standards in these terms:
Empirical evidence is woefully inadequate, but a strong argument can be made for the conten-
tion that the average motorist is performing near the limits of his potential as a master of the
modern automobile. . . . If this is true, then there is all the more reason to see if something
can't be done to help the average motorist survive a crash without serious injury.
What I am saying is this, since human beings err, since drivers err, since drivers make
mistakes, and they are always going to make mistakes, that automobiles should be built in such
a way as to minimize the damage done.
Traffic Safety: Hearings on S. 3005 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 32,
47 (1966). On the Senate Floor, R..icoff described the Act's rulemaking provisions as "revolution-
ary." 112 Cong. Rec. 14,230 (1966).
The Senate Report on the legislation also reflected the central role that crashworthiness standards
were expected to play. The report stated:
For too many years, the public's proper concern for the safe driving habits and capacity of the
driver (the "nut behind the wheel") was permitted to overshadow the role of the car itself. The
"second collision"-the impact of the individual within the vehicle against the steering wheel,
dashboard, windshield, etc.-has been largely neglected.
The Committee heard compelling testimony that passenger cars can be designed and con-
structed so as to afford substantial protection against the "second collision" for both driver and
passenger; further, that some of these design changes can be achieved at little or no additional
manufacturing cost.
Traffic Safety Act of 1966, S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2709, 2710-11. The corresponding House report expressed similar convic-
tions. H. R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966) (need for legislation justified by reference
to "vast room for improvement in the 'second collision' area").
UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED popularized the concept of the second collision. R. NADER, UNSAFE AT
ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965). Sales of Nader's
book surged contemporaneously with congressional deliberations on the proposed legislation and
helped generate a rationale for enactment that politicians seemed to find compelling. The proposed
legislation was steadily strengthened in tandem with the growing public perception that auto fatalities
and injuries could be reduced through improvements in crashworthiness design. Under the Johnson
Administration's proposal, safety standards were completely discretionary. Moreover, standards were
not permitted to be imposed for a two-year period to enable manufacturers to make improvements on
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Operating at the intersection of these institutional and policy innova-
tions, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA)
central task, as of 1966, could be described quite simply. The Agency's job
was to promulgate rules that would force manufacturers to build vehicles
that better protected their occupants in case of a crash. To be sure, the
agency's mandate was not confined exclusively to the protection of vehicle
occupants by rules addressed to post-accident energy transfer (in common
parlance, "the second collision"). The agency also could exercise its
rulemaking authority to promote "crash avoidance" technologies,5 and it
had adjudicatory authority to force manufacturers to furnish notice to
owners of automobiles of "defects" relating to vehicle safety.' But the big
safety payoffs were thought to lie in the agency's central regulatory task of
"forcing" the technology of vehicle occupant protection.'
a voluntary basis. Traffic Safety: Hearing on H.R. 13,228 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce (pt. 1), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-8 (1966). In final form, the Safety Act
required regulators to issue safety standards within a strict timetable. Initial standards were required
to be issued within five months of the Act's passage; "new and revised" standards were required to be
issued within a year thereafter. Safety Act § 103(h), 80 Stat. 718, 720 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1392(h) (1982)).
5. Safety Act § 106, 80 Stat. 718, 721 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982)). Crash
avoidance technologies seek to prevent the "first collision"-the initial impact between the automobile
and an object in its external environment. NHTSA has promulgated a series of safety standards
mandating that crash avoidance technologies be incorporated into vehicle design. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §
571.105 (1986) (requirements for hydraulic brake systems); 49 C.F.R. § 571.108 (1986) (performance
standards for lamps and reflective devices); 49 C.F.R. § 571.111 (1986) (rearview mirrors).
6. Safety Act § 113(e), 80 Stat. 718, 726 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982)).
Amendments passed in 1974 empowered the agency to force the automaker to remedy defects without
charge. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492, § 102(a), 88
Stat. 1470, 1471 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1414(a) (1982)).
The statute "defines" but does not explain the meaning of the term "defect." See 15 U.S.C. §
1391(11) (1982) (defect "includes any defect in performance, construction, components or materials in
motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment"). The Senate Report accompanying the original legisla-
tion stated that "the term 'defect' is used in the sense of an error or mistake in design, manufacture, or
assembly." Traffic Safety Act of 1966, S. REP. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CoD: CON;. & ADMIN. N :ws 2709, 2716. The House report offered no guidance.
The agency has refused to issue an administrative definition on grounds that "any attempt to pre-
cisely define safety related defect would be ill-advised" and that "lwlhether a defect exists depends
solely on the facts of the particular situation." 38 Fed. Reg. 9510 (1973). As a practical matter, the
industry's own practices and customs appear to be determinative. NHTSA has never ordered an
industry-wide recall and has refused to call vehicles "defective" which comply with prevailing norms
for vehicles of the same type or class.
7. The original Act comprised four titles. Title I, "Motor Vehicle Safety Standards," was con-
ceived by safety advocates to be "the heart of the bill." Traffic Safety: Hearings on S. 3005 Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. 34 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff). Title I
empowered the agency to set standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor
vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." Regulators were authorized to impose minimum
standards only on vehicle and equipment performance, not design. In formulating standards, regula-
tors were required to consider relevant data, including the results of research, development, testing
and evaluation conducted under the Act; to consult with state officials "to the extent appropriate"; and
to consider whether proposed standards were "reasonable, practicable, and appropriate" for the par-
ticular type of motor vehicle or equipment which they addressed. Safety Act §§ 102(2), 103, 80 Stat.
718, 718, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391(2), 1392 (1982)).
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The regulatory and technological ambitions of NHTSA's supporters
paralleled the public health dimensions of the problem attacked. Automo-
bile accidents were not just the leading cause of accidental death, they
were-and are-the leading cause of death for all persons from ages five
to thirty-four.' For every person killed in an automobile, six more suf-
fered disabling injuries. The grim statistics on vehicular mayhem hovered
in the range of 50,000 deaths and 300,000 disabling injuries per year.9
The scientists, engineers, and public activists who supported the 1966 Act
foresaw public health benefits from redesigning the automobile that ri-
valled the most significant public health breakthroughs of the past, includ-
ing such staggering successes as the protection and treatment of public
water supplies.
From the vantage point of more than twenty years, of course, the opti-
mism of 1966 seems rather quaint. The leaders of the regulatory reform
movement believed in the social efficacy of federal power expressed
through law. Their central political heuristic was the development of civil
rights law from Brown v. Board of Education0 to the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 Surely other social ills, from poverty to pollution to the carnage on
the roads, would respond to appropriate forms of national legal interven-
tion. The proponents of the new science of accidents were equally san-
guine. They often drew their supporting political images from the
8. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY Table
A-17 (1983) (listing leading causes of death by age group for 1981).
9. See R. CRANDALL, H. GREEI SPECHT, T. KEELER & L. LAVE, REGULATING THE AUTOMO-
BILE 57, 76 (1986) (providing statistics on motor vehicle fatalities and injuries from 1961 to 1982)
[hereinafter REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE]. Other analyses indicate that the ratio of injuries to
fatalities is much higher-possibly on the order of one hundred to one. 2 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, AUTOMOBILE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 6, 185-86 (1979).
10. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955).
11. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000d-6
(1982)).
A strong egalitarian impulse conceived of automobile safety as an "entitlement" whose content was
defined by "the average person's" limited capacities. See, e.g., Traffic Safety: Hearings on S. 3005
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff)
(person driving Plymouth, Ford, or Chevrolet is "entitled" to "certain basic things" "just as much as
a person driving a Cadillac," including collapsible steering wheels and dual brakes); Id. at 181-82
(remarks of William I. Steiglitz) (automobiles driven not only by "professional test drivers," but by
"average person" and car is causally related to accident when it conflicts with "basic human charac-
teristics" and "places demands on the driver that are beyond his capability").
The asserted need for equal protection and the promise of governmental efficacy submerged con-
cerns that legislation would infringe upon 'states rights.' Id. at 41-42 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff) ("we
have been sucked in with the propaganda that the Federal Government has no place in traffic safety;
that we should leave this up to the states. There isn't a state in the country that has the facilities or
the qualifications to go into the complexities of the automobile"); Traffic Safety: Hearings on H.R.
13,228 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 785
(1966) (remarks of Rep. Mackay) ("chaos will result if 50 different states set 50 different sets of
standards").
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technological and managerial accomplishments of the space program.'2
With a NASA-like combination of political will and technical sophistica-
tion, success in the battle against vehicle injury and death seemed
inexorable.
The combination of these political symbols proved extraordinarily pow-
erful in the concrete context of the automobile safety debate. Safety par-
tisans effectively characterized the vehicle safety problem as a problem of
social irresponsibility. 3 Fixated on styling and power, the manufacturers
had allegedly failed to provide the public with the safer vehicles that were
technologically feasible. Indeed, the manufacturers had for years sup-
ported a governmental response to auto safety that focused on driver be-
havior, while making only limited use of the results of research into safer
vehicle designs that they had themselves partially funded.' 4 Regulation
therefore was thought essential to shift the industry's design priorities
from tailfins to passenger protection. Acting out a consensus that rarely
attends legislative programs more controversial than the declaration of
National Secretaries Day, Congress passed the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act-subjecting the largest industry in the United
States to comprehensive safety regulation for the first time-without a sin-
gle negative vote in either house."
Two decades later, our expectations have been lowered. The central
images of our political debates are Watergate and Vietnam. The moral
force of Brown v. Board of Education has been blunted by the
12. See, e.g., Traffic Safety: Hearings on S. 3005 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1966) (remarks of Robert F. Kennedy) (urging application of "same imaginative
techniques that we are using to win the race to the moon to eliminate the most deadly features of
today's cars"); Traffic Safety: Hearings on H.R. 13,228 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1966) (remarks of N.Y. State Rep. Edward Speno)
("[I1f we can send a man to the moon and back, why can't we design a safe automobile here on
earth?"); id. at 781 (remarks of Col. John P. Stapp) (urging that "most completely regulated form of
transportation by the Federal Government is space flight" and that "the international record in space
flight today" is "17 flights, 733 orbits, 1,163 hours, 31 minutes, 28 seconds" and "19,033,250 miles
covered without a single injury or fatality"). Amazement over the nation's progress towards reaching
the moon subdued concern over the costs of auto safety regulation. See Traffic Safety: Hearings on S.
3005 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 211 (1966) (remarks of Robert F.
Kennedy) (country can afford to spend $150 million on auto safety, where NASA is spending several
billion dollars to ensure astronauts' safety).
13. See, e.g., Traffic Safety: Hearings on H.R. 13,228 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 321 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Macdonald) (auto indus-
try has responsibility to give people not only what they want, but what they can handle); TRAFFIC
SAFETY AcT oF 1966, S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CON;. & ADMIN. NEws 2709 (reporting "disturbing evidence of the automobile industry's
chronic subordination of safe design to promotional styling and of overriding stress on power, acceler-
ation, speed and 'ride' to the relative neglect of safe performance or collision protection"); C.
MCCARRY, CITIZEN NADER 13-96 (1972).
14. See J. EAs'MAN, SrY.INc V. SAFETY 209-33 (1984).
15. 112 CoNe;. REC. 14,256 (1966) (Senate vote); 112 CONG. REC. 19,669 (1966) (House of
Representatives vote).
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ambivalence of Bakke."0 Neil Armstrong's "giant step for mankind" is
remembered less vividly than the cloud that engulfed the space shuttle
Challenger seventy-two seconds after takeoff. Hence, when we argue that
the vehicle safety program has not fulfilled its sponsors' dreams-indeed,
virtually has abandoned its safety goals-there may be a tendency to greet
this report of yet another "government failure" with a barely-stifled
yawn.
But hear us out. There are many explanations for NHTSA's failure to
redesign and socialize the automobile in the ways that safety activists
imagined in 1966; none need be interpreted as making failure inevitable.
Each regulatory problem has, or had, a remedy. The failure to use the
available remedies suggests that there is a deeper, more interesting, and
less easily resolved issue about motor vehicle safety regulation. We suspect
that NHTSA succeeded by failing; that it legitimated its existence by
abandoning its statutory mandate. For both the regulatory reform and ve-
hicle safety initiatives embodied in the 1966 Act may have been politically
naive. The inefficacy of the New Deal agencies' post-hoc adjudicatory
techniques may have been one of their primary political strengths. And
the shift from blaming drivers for accidents to blaming automobiles for
injuries may have created a political drama that would have a necessarily
short run. The plot line was too complex for general audiences and the
"villains," the automobile companies, were both too important economi-
cally and too beset by economic troubles to bear the sustained public disaf-
fection necessary to mobilize political support.
A comprehensive evaluption of whether the public wants, or should
"rationally" want, NHTSA to engage in the ambitious program of safety
regulation envisaged in 1966, however, cannot be provided here. In this
Article we concentrate on only one impediment17 to NHTSA's adoption of
safety regulations-the requirement that those rules survive pre-
enforcement judicial review. This Article first demonstrates that NHTSA
has abandoned its rulemaking mandate in favor of regulation by recall-a
shift in regulatory technique virtually synonymous with abandonment of
the agency's more ambitious safety goals. In Part II, we sketch our partic-
ular perspective on the explanation of regulatory behavior and the func-
tion of the legal culture in our general "environmental hypothesis." The
Article in Part III turns to its central focus, the differential impact of
16. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that reservation of
specific number of medical school positions for minority candidates invalid absent finding of past
discrimination).
17, Other influences on NHTSA's conduct include Congress, the Executive Branch, press cover-
age, public opinion, and internal professional conflict. A detailed discussion of all of these factors is
provided in our forthcoming book.
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"judicial review" on agency rulemaking and recall activities. While we do
not claim that judicial review has been the sole cause of the agency's shift
from rules to recalls, we believe it demonstrable that judicial review has
strongly reinforced that shift. Finally, we offer some speculations about
why judicial review of NHTSA took the particular form that it did.
I. The Regulatory Track Record
NHTSA's regulatory behavior can be described concisely. Established
as a rulemaking agency to force the technology of automobile safety
design, NHTSA indeed functioned in a rulemaking mode from roughly its
inception in 1966 until about 1974. NHTSA's promulgated rules, how-
ever, have had extremely modest technology-forcing 8 effects. The rules
that have become operational have required off-the-shelf technologies,
many of which were already in widespread, if not universal, use at the
time of the standards' promulgation." Since the mid-1970's, NHTSA has
instead concentrated on its alternative statutory power to force the recall
of motor vehicles that contain "defects" related to safety performance. It
has thus retreated to a traditional form of case-by-case adjudication which
requires little, if any, technological sophistication and which has no
known effects on vehicle safety.
Personnel at NHTSA hotly contest this description. They maintain that
NHTSA retained its rulemaking focus at least until the first Reagan Ad-
ministration.2 0 This is demonstrably not the case. Of some fifty general
safety regulations adopted under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, forty-five (ninety percent) were issued prior to 1974. None of
the fifty were first issued after 1976. By contrast, motor vehicle recalls
18. "Technology-forcing" is a broad term. It includes both the creation of new technologies and
the requirement that existing technologies be embodied in products. New technologies or technological
embodiments may relate to the production process as well as to products brought to market. Whether
an act requires the development of a "new" technology relates principally to the feasibility of its
objectives as a matter of engineering design or production. Because all technological progress must
build on past knowledge, there may be endless debate over what is "new" or how "new" it is. When
we say that NHTSA has achieved little or "modest" technology-forcing, we mean to convey only that
it has required manufacturers to do little they did not already know how to do in 1966. For a general
discussion of technology-forcing, see P. LORANG & L. LINDEN, AUTOMOBILE SAFETY REGULATION:
TECHNOIO(;ICAI. CHANGE AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS 149-54 (1977) (discussing NHTSA's
difficulties in forcing manufacturers to generate new technology).
19. STAFF OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FEDERAL CONSUMER
SAFETY LEGISLATION 21 (1970) (safety standards require features that originated in industry and
were already incorporated in many vehicles); P. LORANG & L. LINDEN, supra note 18, at 64-65
(safety technology "remarkably similar to what it was in 1968, the first year federal rules took
effect"); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IX-43 (1981) (compliance with federal safety stan-
dards described as having "slight influence" on overall pattern of innovation in auto industry).
20. Interview with Joan Claybrook, former Administrator of NHTSA, en route to New Haven,
Connecticut (April 9, 1984).
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have increased from about fifteen million motor vehicles between 1966
and 1970, to some thirty-three million vehicles from 1971 to 1975, to over
thirty-nine million vehicles between 1976 and 1980. Indeed, during the
decade 1976-1985, the Agency supervised the recall of over half as many
American motor vehicles as were sold new. 2
To be sure, recalls levelled off somewhat to a total of about thirty mil-
lion vehicles between 1981 and 1985. But this figure does not include over
ten million Ford vehicles initially determined by NHTSA to have defec-
tive transmissions, for which the negotiated remedy was distribution of a
dashboard warning label to motorists in 1981.22 More importantly, this
considerable recall activity comes at a time when NHTSA has relaxed,
rescinded, or shelved a number of existing and proposed safety
standards.2"
The date of first adoption of general rules may, of course, not be the
best indicator of the agency's rulemaking activity. A number of automobile
safety standards (rules) are quite broad. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) 201, for example, specifies requirements for car inter-
iors to minimize post-crash injuries.24 It covers a wide number of specific
topics, such as requirements for instrument panels, seat backs, protru-
sions, sun visors, and arm rests. Over time, advances in technology or
design might well require major amendments to such a rule, perhaps to-
tally transforming the prescriptions contained in the rule as of its adoption
date in 1967. Hence, in measuring rulemaking activity, one should also
pay attention to amendments.
Moreover, it may be pl usible to imagine that the agency could main-
tain its level of rulemaking effort while not successfully concluding many
rulemaking proceedings. After all, in the early years of its operation an
agency can borrow standards that are already utilized elsewhere-by
21. The Agency's safety standards are set out at 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.1-571.302 (1986) (codifying 26
crash avoidance standards, 21 crashworthiness standards, and 2 post-crash standards). The statistics
on agency regulations were compiled by examining Federal Register notices issued by the Agency
from its inception until July 1, 1985. Recall data were derived from the Agency's annual reports.
Additional recall information was examined from a data base compiled by Richard Tobin at the State
University of New York at Buffalo, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged. See also Tobin,
Recalls and the Remediation of Hazardous or Defective Consumer Products: The Experiences of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 16
J. CONs. AFF. 278, 288-89 (1982) (reporting number of vehicles recalled and number of recall cam-
paigns initiated by NHTSA between 1966 and 1982).
22. See Center for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding
Secretary of Transportation's decision to settle case without litigation).
23. NHTSA Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-53 (1982) (statement of Clarence Ditlow, Director,
Center for Auto Safety) (during first 16 months of Reagan Administration, NHTSA rescinded or
relaxed existing rules or terminated pending rulemaking in 19 instances, and proposed similar actions
in an additional 21 instances).
24. 49 C.F.R. § 571.201 (1986).
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insurance agencies, private standard-setting associations, government pro-
curement offices, and the like-which have a significant history and are
relatively noncontroversial. Rulemaking initiatives proposing the use of
truly novel technologies may require a much longer gestation period.
These considerations suggest that in measuring rulemaking activity one
should take into account not only amendments but also the general level of
rulemaking activity, as revealed by all actions related to rules. Later, more
technologically advanced activities may also have greater safety impacts,
such that a smaller number of actions would in fact represent a more
aggressive regulatory presence. Finally, one should be attentive to the allo-
cation of agency resources. A small output of important and novel stan-
dards may represent an increasing rather than a decreasing investment in
rulemaking as a regulatory technique.
Yet observed from any of these perspectives the general picture of
NHTSA activities remains the same. It is surely the case that NHTSA's
official rulemaking activity as evidenced by Federal Register notices is
much more significant post-1976 than its final rules suggest. But the
maintenance and amendment functions those notices reveal are often sub-
stantively trivial. Taking together the trivial and the significant, total
rulemaking issuances in NHTSA's second decade number less than half
those of its first.
From the standpoint of regulatory effects, counting rulemaking issu-
ances actually overstates the impact of NHTSA's post-1 976 rulemaking
activity. While we are unaware of any year-by-year data on the incremen-
tal benefits of NHTSA's safety standards,"5 price impact information is
available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 6 The BLS data re-
veal that about ninety-two percent of all price increases tied to NHTSA's
safety rules occurred over the period from 1967 to 1976. Only eight per-
cent of net price increases were imposed from 1977 to 1986. It is simply
not plausible to believe that NHTSA discovered, sometime around 1976, a
way to get more bang for the regulatory-compliance buck. There is no
evidence of such a quantum jump in the efficacy of the regulatory technol-
25. There are engineering estimates as well as regression analyses of the impact of NHTSA's
safety standards on injuries and deaths. See, e.g., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE, supra note 9, at
45-84 (1986).
26. BLS issues annual reports on the value of "quality changes" in automobiles, in order to ex-
clude such values from its calculations of price increases attributable solely to inflation. In making
these calculations, BLS separately identifies increases and decreases in auto prices attributable to new
safety requirements (or revocations of requirements), whether in the form of new rules or amend-
ments to old rules. The BLS data include NHTSA's bumper standard, which is both a safety measure
and a property protection measure. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT ON QuAt.rY CHANGES
FOR 1986 MODEt. PASSENGER YEAR (1985). See also NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, PRELIMINARY REPORT: THE COST OF AUTOMOBILE SAFETY STANDARDS 17
(1982) (tabulating BLS data for model years 1968-1982).
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ogy. It seems much more probable to imagine that the pre- and post-1976
cost figures simply reflect the real effects of NHTSA's regulations on
automobile manufacturers in those periods.
Nor does a story of intensified effort stymied by technological barriers
square well with the data. The regulatory record is littered with ideas and
proposals of remarkably modest technological sophistication that have
never found their way into regulatory form.2" NHTSA also has sponsored
considerable research on vehicle safety technology, but has used little
learned in any of these endeavors. 8
NHTSA's shift from rules to recalls is also reflected in its allocation of
resources to these two areas of activity. When reasonably full staffing had
been achieved, by about 1970, NHTSA employed fifty-four rulemaking
27. In October 1971, for example, the Agency issued a comprehensive rulemaking plan which
contemplated various innovations. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, PRO-
GRAM PLAN FOR MOTOR VE:HICLE SAFETY STANDARDS A-14 (pedestrian protection) (1971); id. at
A-45 (tire pressure warning indicators); id. at A-22 (motorcycle rider protection); A-38 (improved bus
and truck uphill performance); id. at A-53 (spray protectors); id. at A-59 (limits on toxic gases and
noise in the passenger compartment); id. at A-61 (alcohol interlocks, which would "sense the driver's
impairment due to alcohol consumption by requiring specified tasks involving reaction time, judgment,
etc., or analysis of his breath or other means," and prevent engine ignition once sensor triggered); id.
at A-60 (speed controls to limit vehicle speed to 95 miles per hour and cause the vehicle's horn to
sound and lights to brighten at speeds between 81 and 85 miles per hour, in order to warn bystanders
of the presence of a vehicle being driven at excessive speed).
The Agency tentatively predicted that initiatives described in the plan could generate benefits total-
ling $75.9 billion at a cost of $37.8 billion, yielding net benefits of $48.1 billion at an overall benefit/
cost ratio of 2.7:1. The intiatives were expected to save about 20,000 lives annually by 1980. Motor
Vehicle Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1972).
Although the Agency to our knowledge never withdrew these cost/benefit predictions, many initia-
tives described in the plan, or elsewhere, (including all of those identified above), have not been imple-
mented. Some proposals, for example the alcohol ignition interlock, never made it off the drawing
board. Others, such as an initiative on radar brakes, were tentatively proposed but never pursued in
rulemaking, or elsewhere, 37 Fed. Reg. 15,003 (1972) (Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), or
were formally proposed but were dropped in the face of public criticism (e.g., speed controls), or
industry resistance (e.g., periscopes). See 35 Fed. Reg. 18,295 (Proposed Motor Vehicle Safety Stan-
dard; proposing that "no vehicle be able to attain a speed greater than 95 miles per hour" under
specified test conditions); FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM: REPORT BY THE
House. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1976) (mere whisper of speed control in 1970 reported to
provoke "a flood of hostile mail"); GENERAL. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
PI.ANNING AND USING MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESEARCH 17-19 (1974) (Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on indirect field of view withdrawn in March, 1973 due to negative comments from
industry on periscope).
The Agency eventually adopted a requirement that speedometers not indicate speeds over 85 miles
per hour. No limit was placed on the actual speed capabilities of vehicles, however. The Agency
reasoned that the rule would help to prevent the temptation of "immature" motorists to drive at
excessive speeds. 45 Fed. Reg. 40,585 (1980), codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.127 (1980). The require-
ment was revoked before taking effect. 47 Fed. Reg. 7250 (1982).
Indeed the Agency has methodically pursued the initiatives on pedestrian protection for nearly two
decades, in a seemingly endless quest for additional data. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IM-
PROVEMENTS NEEDED IN PLANNING AND USING MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESEARCH (1974).
Other initiatives are still being considered, some 16 years after the plan was issued. 52 Fed. Reg.
14644, 14647 (1987) (NHTSA Semi-Annual Regulatory Agenda, identifying continuing work on
pedestrian protection and spray protectors).
28. See P. LORANG & L. LINDEN, supra note 18, at 47-70, 141-46.
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engineers and only thirteen defects investigators. From that time forward,
there has been a continuous decline in the former and increase in the
latter. Parity was achieved in 1982. Thereafter recall personnel have out-
numbered rulemaking officials.29
For all these reasons we are persuaded that the motor vehicle safety
program really has changed over time and that the changes are very
nearly as dramatic as simple statistics on the output of rules and recalls
suggest. Moreover, it seems clear that these changes began long before the
Reagan Administration took office. Indeed the shift from rulemaking to
recalls is particularly characteristic of the Carter Administration in which
Joan Claybrook, a long-time associate of Ralph Nader and a vigorous and
staunch defender of the appropriateness of automobile safety regulation, 0
headed the agency.31 Something happened at NHTSA, and it is not to be
29. Today the Office of Defects Investigations employs 42 full-time, non-clerical personnel and 4
part-time clerks. The Office of Vehicle Standards employs 32 non-clerical personnel and 3 part-time
clerks.
When NHTSA commenced its standard-setting efforts on October 8, 1966, its rulemaking group
consisted of eight engineers on loan from the Federal Aviation Administration, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, and the Post Office. Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1967). After a flurry of activity to meet the statutory
deadline for issuance of initial rules, regulatory officials turned their attention to establishing a formal
rulemaking structure. Rulemaking activities were assigned to an Associate Administrator for Motor
Vehicle Programs (MVP). Within MVP, the Office of Operating Systems and the Office of
Crashworthiness were given responsibility for crash-avoidance rules and crashworthiness rules, re-
spectively. A separate organizational unit, under the direction of another Associate Administrator, was
responsible for long-term research and development.
Staffing in crash-avoidance and crashworthiness totalled 55 persons in 1971 and 52 persons in
1975. In 1978 the two offices were merged into a single office, the Office of Vehicle Safety Standards.
Office staffing totalled 34 in 1980 and 30 in 1983. NHTSA Personnel Data (1983) (on file with the
authors).
The agency formally commenced its recall activities on October 27, 1967, when a Defects Division
was established with a professional staff of three persons. By December 1970, the division consisted of
13 engineers and technicians. Auto Safety Repairs at No Cost: Hearings on S. 355 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 174-75 (1973). Personnel data provided by NHTSA indi-
cate that staffing in the Office of Defects Investigations totalled 24 persons in 1972, 25 persons in
1975, 29 persons in 1980, and 32 persons in 1983. NHTSA Personnel Data, supra.
The stature of the defects office has steadily grown with its acquisition of resources, as has its
autonomy from the rulemaking enterprise. The recall staff was organized in October, 1967 as a tiny
division within the Office of Standards Enforcement (OSE), reporting to the agency's chief rulemak-
ing engineer, the Associate Administrator for MVP. In July 1971 the Defects Division was removed
from OSE and raised to the status of a separate office, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI).
Defect investigators continued to report to the Associate Administrator for MVP.
In 1978, ODI was removed entirely from the control of the chief rulemaker. Together with the
Office of Fuel Economy Compliance and Vehicle Safety Compliance, the ODI was placed under the
control of the newly established post of Associate Administrator for Enforcement. 43 Fed. Reg. 8525
(1978) (codified as amended at 49 C.F.R. § 501 (1986)). We were told by an agency official in 1981
that the reorganization was designed in part to give defects more visibility.
30. For a sample of Claybrook's views, see D. BOLLIER & J. CLAYBROOK, FREEDOM FROM
HARM (1986); Claybrook & Bollier, The Hidden Benefits of Regulation: Disclosing the Auto Safety
Payoff, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 87 (1985).
31. The slowdown in auto safety rulemaking was reported by knowledgeable observers long
before the Reagan Administration took office in January, 1981. In 1976, for example, a subcommittee
of the Agency's House oversight committee reported that NHTSA's rulemaking program "has been
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explained by facile reference to changing administrations' well-known
pro- or anti-regulatory biases.
II. Explaining NHTSA's Regulatory Behavior
Explaining regulatory legislation and agency implementing behavior
has become a substantial cottage industry. Attempts to predict the form of
regulatory legislation and the behavior of implementing agencies take two
general tacks. The first harks back to the progressive era and postulates
what might be called a general "public welfare hypothesis." In the second
model, politicians and bureaucrats are viewed as driven by self-interest.
The form of regulatory legislation and the policy choices of bureaucrats
are merely epiphenomena of this more basic pursuit of private gain. 2
A. The "Public Welfare" Hypothesis
According to the public welfare theory, legislators adopt regulatory leg-
islation in order to pursue the public interest, or general welfare.
Implementing agencies pursue these public welfare goals by applying ap-
subject to across-the-board delays of long promised standards;" that "only a handful of significant
amendments to existing standards have been issued by NHTSA;" and that "the slowdown is an
example of the virtual abandonment of a major Congressional directive that is only 10 years old."
FEIERAI. REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM: REPORT BY THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVER-
SIGHT AND INVESIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 166, 168 (Subcomm. print 1976). Based on a comprehensive review of the agency's
regulatory activities over the preceding decade, the subcomittee concluded: "In summary, in recent
years NHTSA has produced fewer and fewer significant rulemaking actions, What NHTSA has not
done speaks louder than the few regulatory actions it has produced in recent years." Id. at 168.
Ralph Nader likewise observed that progress on setting standards followed a long and tortuous path
in the Carter Administration. In a November 30, 1977 letter to Claybrook, Nader asserted that "apart
from an acceleration of vehicle defect recall investigations-largely a result of processing a backlog of
casework-there has been very little done either in a traditional or 'model agency' mode." Letter from
Ralph Nader to Joan Claybrook, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(Nov. 30, 1977) (on file with the authors). Nader concluded that auto manufacturers would "tolerate
your vehicle recalls, especially with their aftermarket sales stimulation, if they can control the stan-
dards function." Id.
Even while asserting the importance of safety standards, Claybrook herself explicitly recognized the
limitations of rulemaking in forcing technology and stressed the importance of product liability suits to
promote auto safety. In a 1980 article in Trial magazine, Claybrook urged that state legislatures
should abandon efforts to make manufacturers' compliance with regulatory standards a defense
against products liability actions. In pertinent part, Claybrook reasoned that "the rulemaking process
is cumbersome and time consuming and standards often are not updated quickly in response to
changed conditions and new technology." Claybrook, Auto Protection: Beyond Federal Standards,
TRIAL, Nov. 1980, at 38-41. Claybrook also reasoned that regulatory standards reflect the production
capabilities of the smallest companies, and that rules "cannot anticipate and cover all important as-
pects of motor vehicle performance." Id. at 39.
32. For an extensive survey of the literature on both the "public welfare" and "self-interest"
models, see Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidisciplinary Survey and Synthesis, in
REGUI.ATORY POIHCY AND rHE SoCIALI. SCIENCES 9 (R. Noll ed. 1985).
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propriate, expert judgment to decision-making tasks within their
jurisdiction.
The particular form of regulatory legislation is thus explicable through
an analysis of the social or economic problem that the legislature intended
to address. Natural monopoly conditions bring forth entry and rate regu-
lation; information asymmetries generate a regulatory response in the
form of labeling requirements or other methods of information disclosure;
the necessity to preserve urban amenities yields planning and zoning re-
quirements. To be sure, the legislature may misanalyze particular social
problems and prescribe the wrong solution. But reform from this public
welfare perspective merely entails the correction of cognitive errors.
The public welfare story of regulatory implementation has a similar
cast. The problems of implementation largely concern technique or meth-
odology. Bureaucratic behavior is a constant search for appropriate means
to implement legislatively-prescribed goals. Administrative reform would
entail changes that promise to bring appropriate technical, scientific, or
managerial expertise to bear upon the agency's task."3
From this public welfare perspective, one might begin to explain the
course of auto safety regulation by imagining that NHTSA's choice of
regulatory technique has been driven by the pursuit of the congressional
goal of automobile safety. One would then attempt to determine whether
the agency's decisions have indeed produced beneficial results, and if not,
where its analysis of the costs and benefits of its two forms of regulation
has gone wrong. Of course one might discover that the agency has been
trapped into a suboptimal regulatory posture by some flaw in its empow-
ering legislation, perhaps some lack of congressional foresight concerning
the legal or other resources that the agency would need to accomplish its
mission. Or one might discover that Congress had misestimated the need
for design changes in automobiles, and that the agency had simply discov-
ered that the best use of its rulemaking power was to let it atrophy.
B. The Private Interest Model: Agency Capture
As might be imagined, the private interest perspective gives rise to a
rich set of stories and hypotheses about legislative-administrative behavior.
The search constantly is for whose private interest is being served. 4
One of the most richly elaborated theories derived from a self-interest
model is that of "industry capture." This theory relies on a set of inter-
33. For critical reviews of the "public interest" theory of government regulation, see R. NOLL,
REFORMING RE;UI.ATION 33-46 (1971); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON.
& McGM'r. Sci. 335 (1974).
34. See, e.g., Shughart, Tollison & Kimenyi, The Political Economy of Immigration Restrictions,
4 YAI.E J. ON R t;. 79 (1986) (arguing that immigration law enforcement responds to domestic labor
interests).
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locking private interest hypotheses. The first is that industries seek to ob-
tain supracompetitive profits by inducing the government to limit
competition." The second hypothesis is that industries pursue this objec-
tive by offering support to reelection-oriented legislators in return for ap-
propriate regulation. Third, legislators are prepared to enter into the bar-
gain because significant benefits can be given to a well-organized industry
without arousing much notice on the part of the widely dispersed and
unorganized citizenry that will pay for this regulatory largesse. Once in
operation, the regulatory scheme is maintained in the interest of the regu-
lated industry by bureaucrats who look both to Congress and the industry
for their rewards. These rewards flow from industry in the form of social
and business relations and the prospects of further career opportunities in
the private sector. Rewards also include the goodwill of oversight and ap-
propriations committees staffed by legislators who can derive the greatest
electoral payoff from the regulation in question.
The capture story has a number of variations. It might be imagined, for
example, that the industry does not actually solicit the regulatory legisla-
tion, and indeed, may oppose it. But once in place the regulatory bureau-
cracy succumbs to the perennial blandishments of industry coupled with
the self-interested preferences of those few legislators who elect to serve on
the relevant oversight or appropriations committees. In an even less con-
spiratorial mode, "capture" comes about simply by virtue of the industry's
superior resources and organization in generating and presenting informa-
tion to the relevant decision-makers. Ultimately the industry view of regu-
lation becomes the factual predicate upon which the regulators regulate.
Nor need the "capturer" be an industry. A capturer must merely have the
organization and resources to deliver rewards to reelection-oriented legis-
lators or career-oriented bureaucrats. 6
35. A subsidiary tenet is that limiting competition by private agreement is difficult to orchestrate
without governmental assistance,
36. The capture story for automobile safety regulation can thus be told in the context of automo-
bile safety regulation with either General Motors or Ralph Nader in the role of captor. Or at least it
could be if the facts so warranted. Moreover, the captors might change identity over time. Perhaps
Nader captured Congress in 1966 to get the legislation passed, but by the mid-1970's the system had
switched to operating in the interests of industry.
There is also a somewhat less developed literature on the internal capture of regulatory systems by
particular coalitions of bureaucrats or bureaucrats and legislators. Perhaps the most tantalizing dis-
cussion for our purposes concerns the influence of various professional subcultures on agency regula-
tory activity. Thus, for example, the Federal Trade Commission's prosecutorial policy has been de-
scribed as the output of negotiations between lawyers and economists within the Commission having
quite different professional perspectives and, more importantly, quite different professional reward
structures outside the agency. R. KATZMAN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY (1985).
NHTSA is similarly an agency that contains within it several different, and arguably competing,
professional cadres. We might imagine competition for the heart of the agency's regulatory program
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C. Public and Private Interest Combined: The Environmental
Hypothesis
Both the public welfare and private interest approaches provide useful
perspectives on NHTSA's development of regulatory policy. But neither
the overall story, nor the one we recount here, is fully articulable within
either of these traditions. In part this is because the two traditions are not
nearly so distinct as their developers and advocates might make them out
to be. In the most general sense, the idea of the public welfare or public
interest in American political life tends to be more a procedural than a
substantive notion. In a pluralist democratic polity, the policy output of
competition amongst various interests may be precisely what is meant by
"the public interest" or "pursuing the public welfare." Pluralist theory
does not hypothesize an overarching general will or interest that can be
specified as the aim or goal of the social order. Hence a legislative-
administrative policy process in which people both inside and outside gov-
ernment are imagined to be pursuing their own aims may be said to gen-
erate "public interest" outcomes.
At some level, of course, the blending of public and private interest
hypotheses in pluralist theory renders the idea of the public interest com-
pletely empty. "The public interest" becomes simply the vector sum or
output of the policy process, whatever that output might be. As a behav-
ioral hypothesis this form of public interest theory is non-falsifiable; as a
descriptive heuristic, it is indistinguishable from a private interest
perspective.
Private interest notions suffer from similar defects. If a regulatory stat-
ute has any effect at all, it of necessity rearranges the legal claims availa-
ble to various members of the body politic. If rights have values, this re-
distribution of rights benefits some more than others. Every regulatory
scheme can thus be found to be run in the interest of some group or coali-
tion of groups who obtain special benefits. Moreover, even if some or all
of the benefitted group fail to recognize the improvement in their positions
that the regulatory scheme would bring, it seems likely that they will no-
tice over time. Eventually, therefore, they will attempt to sustain or even
improve these beneficial results. Finding a group or groups who are being
benefitted, and who are behaving strategically to maintain those benefits,
is virtually assured with respect to every regulatory system. The null hy-
pothesis is always rejected. Moreover, since no group will ever get all it
wants, the private interest story is one of complex compromises amongst
amongst the safety engineers, the legal staff, and the economists who staff the policy and evaluation
office. See infra note 98.
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groups whose goals all can be, and are, articulated in public interest
terms. The statutory or regulatory outcome is thus descriptively indistin-
guishable from the public interest story.
Mindful of the vagueness, overlaps, and normative loadings of these
two analytic traditions, we tell the story of auto safety regulation at
NHTSA using somewhat unconventional labels. Our most general per-
spective, which we call the "environmental hypothesis," is reminiscent of
both private interest and public welfare analyses. 7 This explanation
posits that NHTSA is struggling to provide the form of regulation that
society wants. As it engages in this struggle, the agency receives feedback
from many sources, including Congress, the courts, the Executive Office of
the President, interest group activity, general public opinion as expressed
in opinion polls and press commentary, and many others. Responding to
this rich environmental feedback, the agency engages in actions designed
to explore the contours of its legitimate regulatory mandate. The apparent
success or failure of its prior efforts, as indicated by signals from impor-
tant actors in the agency's environment, induces adaptations that, over
time, profoundly influence the agency's regulatory approach.
This Article pursues a special form of the environmental story which
we call the "legal culture hypothesis." In short form the hypothesis is
that, legally, adopting rules is difficult; recalling "defective" automobiles is
easy. Judicial review of NHTSA's regulatory effort thus has reinforced
and legitimated a shift from technology-forcing by rule to consumer assis-
tance by recall.
By labeling our explanation a "legal culture" rather than simply a "ju-
dicial review" hypothesis we mean to signal two important things about
the argument. First, we are not here describing some simple judicial or
congressional "mistake". Recalls do, and rules do not, respond appropri-
ately to the basic political presuppositions of American law. The preferred
or most clearly legitimate form of coercive state intervention in our polity
is remedial. Such intervention attempts to correct past injury or injustice,
usually in individual instances, and on the basis of widely-shared under-
standings of legal and moral responsibility. Recall actions, like common
law warranty claims, tend to fit this paradigm. They charge that automo-
bile companies have sold (past act) defective and potentially dangerous
37. This approach is not entirely novel. It has strong echoes of Allison's Model III, G. ALLISON,
ESSENCE OF DEClISION 144-84 (1971), and Steinbruner's cybernetic decisionmaking models. J. STEIN-
BRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISIONMAKING (1974). Nor is it parsimonious. Because
here we are pursuing only one portion of the agency's environment, the usefulness or comparative
advantage of this approach cannot be demonstrated. The "environmental hypothesis" therefore serves
merely as a label to identify our general perspective on the way that one should seek to understand
regulatory behavior.
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products (existing injury) to unwitting consumers (injustice) who are (in-
dividually) entitled, at their option, to have the defect repaired (remedy).
Safety performance standards, by contrast, assert (in highly technical
language) that some (probablistic) percentage (group) of future injuries or
accidents might be avoided (preventive action) if all (general) automobiles
were systematically modified. Rather than claiming that our settled expec-
tations have been violated and demanding redress, safety rules merely
urge that our future might be more secure if we changed our behavior or
the design of our products-a much less compelling claim for state
intervention.
Hence, if the judicial posture toward rulemaking is a mistake, it is not
a simple one, and its correction may confront overwhelming ideological
obstacles. To find that judicial review retards effective safety regulation is
not to hold out the prospect that there are politically feasible remedies for
that difficulty. Achieving the policy goals articulated for safety regulation
in 1966 may require an unacceptable reorientation of our ideas about the
political legitimacy of administrative regulation.
Second, the "legal culture" hypothesis recognizes that judicial review
decisions establish more (and often less) than technical rules permitting or
prohibiting particular administrative activity. The legal culture as medi-
ated by the judiciary both reflects and shapes the preferences of other reg-
ulatory participants, and it reinforces certain political and professional
values in legislative-bureaucratic battles. The impact of particular judicial
decisions is at once specific and general; amorphous, yet pervasive. Regu-
latory responses thus may seem disproportionate to specific judicial stim-
uli, and the lines of causation from stimulus to response are often drawn
by a faint and wavering hand. The constraints and incentives that emerge
from judicial-administrative interactions are the product of an extraordi-
narily complex mix of values, interests, and institutions functioning in real
time and having, therefore, real histories. This is, in the end, a story about
politics, not physics.
III. NHTSA in Court
NHTSA's judicial track record, pursuing automobile recall orders and
defending its safety standards, has been dramatically discontinuous. When
seeking a recall it has found most legal barriers lying face down in the
cinders; in rulemaking proceedings the agency has confronted obstacles
more appropriate to infantry training than to a track meet. The agency
has lost six of the twelve rulemaking cases decided on the merits;" its
38. NHTSA's safety standards were struck down in whole or in part in Wagner Elec. Corp. v.
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record in defects litigation is blemished by only one defeat, a lower court
case that is being appealed. 9 A study of NHTSA litigation is thus simul-
taneously revealing and puzzling. Feedback from the judicial arena has
surely reinforced a migration toward the recall as a regulatory technique.
But why has NHTSA had this particular experience-an experience that
falsifies the predictions that general administrative law principles might
suggest? To answer that question, we must say something more about the
general structure of judicial review in American administrative law and
elaborate NHTSA's litigation history in some detail.
A. Fixing General Ideas
NHTSA, like most federal administrative agencies, appears before
courts both as a plaintiff and as a defendant. It is a defendant in proceed-
ings attacking the validity of its rules. It is a plaintiff in proceedings
Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d. Cir. 1972) (Standard 108, turn signal and hazard warning flashers); H &
H Tire Co. v. Department of Transp., 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972) (Standard 117, retreaded tires);
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972) (Standard 208, passive
restraint); National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(Standard 117, pneumatic tires); PACCAR, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 573
F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978) (Standard 121, air brakes), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1979); Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (Standard 208).
The agency was upheld in Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (Standard 202, head restraints); Boating Indus. Ass'n v. Boyd, 409 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1969)
(Standard 108, lighting); Ford Motor Co. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 473 F.2d 1241
(6th Cir. 1973) (Standard 208, ignition interlock); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 515
F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1975) (Standard 108); Vehicle Equip. Safety Comm'n v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 611 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1979) (Standard 115, vehicle identification numbers);
Pacific Legal Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir.) (Standard 208), cert.
denied 444 U.S. 830 (1979).
NHTSA's standard for uniform tire quality grading (UTQG) has also been litigated. B.F. Good-
rich Co. v. Department of Transp., 541 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1976) (partial remand); B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Department of Transp., 592 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1979) (standard upheld); Public Citizen v.
Steed, 733 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (invalidating agency suspension of standard). The UTQG stan-
dard requires labelling to indicate certain performance characteristics. The standard is principally a
consumer information measure to enable purchasers to compare tires and make informed purchases.
See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ass'n v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (challenge to "trap
door" provision of Standard 208 dismissed on ripeness grounds), petition for cert. filed sub nom. New
York v. Dole, 55 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1986) (No. 86-999); Center for Auto Safety v. Peck,
751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding relaxation of bumper impact standard, a mixed safety/
property protection measure).
39. NHTSA's recall decisions were upheld in United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d
420 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (outlining lenient standards for summary judgment and remanding for trial;
wheels); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 421 F. Supp. 1239 (D.D.C. 1976) (seat brackets), affd.,
574 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. General Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (carburetor plugs); United States v. General Motors Corp., 561 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(pitman arms); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 453 F. Supp. 1240 (D.D.C. 1978) (windshield
wipers); Center For Auto Safety v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (agency decision not to
recall Ford automobiles with defective transmissions upheld); see also United States v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1047 (D.D.C. 1983) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss; defective
brakes). The Agency's only defeat came in United States v. General Motors Corp., No. 83-2220
(D.D.C. Apr. 14, 1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-5170 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 1987). See also Wall St.
J., May 12, 1987, at 6 (government requesting expedited appellate review).
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seeking to force a recall of "defective" vehicles. Moreover, as is generally
true in civil litigation, NHTSA has the burden of proof as a plaintiff and
is entitled to the "benefit of the doubt" as a defendant. Thus far, then, the
puzzle merely deepens. NHTSA should have an easier time in court
defending its rules than proving its defect cases.
Nor is this assessment altered by any special aspects of administrative
law governing the "deference" that courts should pay to administrative
judgments. Arcane quibbles about the appropriate "scope" of judicial re-
view aside, courts are supposed to uphold NHTSA's rules if they are
"reasonable". The courts exercise a limited scope of review. By contrast,
courts should enforce a proposed recall only if they believe the agency is
correct, for in a recall proceeding the court technically is not "reviewing"
an agency order. The court is making the initial decision itself in a pro-
ceeding in which the agency is merely a special prosecutor. Even if the
defects determination were viewed as an "informal" agency decision put
at issue by way of defense in the judicial enforcement proceeding, judicial
"review" in recall proceedings is said to be "de novo," that is, an indepen-
dent exercise of judicial discretion.4 ° If courts observe the norms of admin-
istrative law, then, other things being equal, they should affirm rulemak-
ing decisions more often than defects determinations.
The normative expectations of administrative lawyers have seldom been
subjected to empirical verification of a more than anecdotal sort. In one of
the rare empirical studies of Supreme Court review of agency action,
Martin Shapiro found that "the courts generally let the agencies do what
they want.""' Seven years later Warner Gardner came to a similar, more
carefully documented, but less succinctly expressable conclusion.4 Taking
all reported federal appellate court decisions for 1974 as his sample,
Gardner found that agencies were affirmed over sixty percent of the time.
This held true for "newer" health, safety, and consumer agencies as well
as for what Gardner termed "old line" agency activities. Moreover, refin-
ing the analysis further, and shifting to a qualitative appraisal, Gardner's
audit found that informal rulemaking, the type of rulemaking exercised by
NHTSA, was treated "deferentially" by reviewing courts fifty-eight per-
cent of the time, while informal adjudication, the category that would in-
clude a NHTSA defect determination, received the closest judicial scrutiny
of any functional category of agency actions.
40. For the Supreme Court's most comprehensive statement of the federal courts' scope of review
with respect to administrative agency action, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971).
41. M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 270-71 (1968).
42. Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75 CoLuM. L.
REV. 800 (1975).
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The irony of "deferential" courts invalidating half of the vehicle safety
rules reviewed, while "independent" courts repeatedly endorse NHTSA's
defects determinations, may disappear, of course, when abstract cases are
given more concrete texture. It is perfectly plausible to imagine that the
agency-perhaps operating through different bureaus and personnel-has
been nearly faultless in its recall initiatives and particularly foolish in its
rulemaking. We believe, however, that such an explanation cannot be
supported by the facts.
B. The Early Rulemaking Cases
Judicial review of safety standards began cautiously, and from the
agency's point of view well, in Automotive Parts & Accessories Associa-
tion v. Boyd.48 The principal plaintiff represented a segment of the auto-
mobile industry which feared that NHTSA's regulation requiring that all
new passenger automobiles be factory-equipped with front seat head re-
straints"" would ultimately foreclose them from a lucrative market for
head restraints as add-on equipment. The Automotive Parts and Accesso-
ries Association (APAA) pursued a host of different legal theories, but in
a careful and scholarly opinion Judge Carl McGowan of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected them all. The McGowan
opinion nevertheless established the basic framework within which judi-
cial review of NHTSA standards would go forward over the ensuing
years. Two aspects of that opinion are of particular interest for our dis-
cussion. Both aspects in some sense "proceduralize" the reviewing court's
investigation of the reasonableness of the agency's standard setting.
First, Judge McGowan set forth what he perceived to be the basic
scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard in Section
10 of the federal Administrative Procedure Act.4 In McGowan's words,
"The paramount objective is to see whether the agency, given an essen-
tially legislative task to perform, has carried it out in a manner calculated
to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the formulation
of rules for general application in the future."'46 So stated, whether an
agency's rule is arbitrary or capricious may turn as much on the agency's
apparent reasoning process as on the good sense of the final judgment
under review.
In a similar vein, the court addressed the question of whether
NHTSA's "concise general statement of basis and purpose" was sufficient
43. 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968) [hereinafter Auto Parts].
44. 49 C.F.R. § 571.202 (1986).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982).
46. Auto Parts, 407 F.2d at 338.
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to pass muster under Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act.47
The NHTSA statement with respect to head restraints was certainly
concise and general. It stated in full: "This standard specifies require-
ments for head restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck
injury in rear-end and other collisions.' 48
The court viewed this statement as unnecessarily terse:
[Oln the occasion of this first challenge to the implementation of the
new statute it is appropriate for us to remind the Administrator of
the ever present possibility of judicial review, and to caution against
an overly literal reading of the statutory terms "concise" and "gen-
eral." These adjectives must be accommodated to the realities of judi-
cial scrutiny, which do not contemplate that the court itself will, by a
laborious examination of the record, formulate in the first instance
the significant issues faced by the agency and articulate the rationale
of their resolution. We do not expect the agency to discuss every item
• . . in informal rulemaking. We do expect that, if the judicial
review which Congress has thought it important to provide is to be
meaningful, the "concise general statement of . . . basis and pur-
pose" mandated by Section 4 will enable us to see what major issues
of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the
agency reacted to them as it did."9
While Judge McGowan put forward this requirement as a necessity of
judicial review, the demand for more elaborate discussion of the major
issues thrown up by the rulemaking proceeding has the equally important
function of reinforcing the participation of outside parties in the Agency's
deliberations. The Agency's failure to respond to significant issues of ei-
ther fact or policy raised by a participant will, under Judge McGowan's
standard, provide a straightforward basis for judicial challenge to the
rationality of the Agency's rule. After all, failure to respond to significant
issues raised by participants can hardly satisfy the basic standard of rea-
sonableness that the court had set forth: to perform its task in a manner
"calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality."5
In the case under review the Administrator had, in another part of the
order promulgating the head restraints standard, specifically responded to
the comments of the APAA. Moreover, the Administrator had elaborated
on this response in a three-page letter rejecting the APAA's request to
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
48. Auto Parts, 407 F.2d at 338 n.12.
49. Id. at 338.
50. Id.
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reconsider the decision to promulgate the standard. In reviewing these
materials Judge McGowan found that:
[T]he picture they present is one of conscientious attention to the
objections raised to the proposed rule, and their reasoned disposition
on the basis of technical information and other relevant considera-
tions which we have no basis for rejecting. The principal elements in
the decision to require factory installation appear to have been (1)
greater ease of enforcement and consequent assurance of the exten-
sion of protection to consumers and (2) the enhancement of protec-
tion due to the relationship between the head restraint and structure
of which it is a part. The one seems evident to us as a matter of
common experience, while the other is amply supported by expert
opinion in record."'
The petitioners argued vigorously that evidence in the record supported
a finding that head restraints could create safety problems. In part these
problems resulted from anatomical variations which could cause some per-
sons to strike their heads on the edges or corners of head restraints. It was
further suggested that head restraints cut down visibility and thus might
cause accidents. In responding to these claims the court said:
There can be no question but that the Administrator, on the basis of
the submissions made to him, could reasonably determine that the
benefits of mandatory head restraints far outweigh any disadvantages
from such restraints due to decreased visibility, or other possible ad-
verse affects on safety. On the one hand, the benefits from the reduc-
tion of neck injuries in rear-end crashes were clearly identifiable
from the information and specific data contained in submissions from
• . . independent sources . . . as well as the substantial statistical
compilation within the Department. The evidence that head re-
straints might lead to significant safety disadvantages, on the other
hand, seems rather speculative. "
In short, in Auto Parts the rulemaking record revealed both conscien-
tious attention to the significant issues and a substantial data base that
was, in part, independently generated. The Agency's technical mastery of
the subject was due in significant degree to the fact that head restraint
technology had long been in use. The rulemaking merely mandated its use
in all newly manufactured vehicles. It remained to be seen how the courts
would deal with NHTSA's more problematic judgments-judgments that
51. Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 342.
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were somewhat more "technology-forcing" and therefore less easily docu-
mented. The Agency did not have to wait long for an answer.
In April, 1971, NHTSA adopted Standard 117 on retreaded tires.53
The standard was based on the belief that retreaded tires should be
expected to provide the same safety characteristics as new tires. Standard
117 in its final form, therefore, merely incorporated five laboratory per-
formance tests that were a part of the safety standards for new tires set
forth previously in Standard 109,"' and never challenged in court. Two of
those standards, the ones specifying performance requirements related to
endurance and high speed driving, however, were now hotly contested by
the retreading industry. The retreaders were understandably concerned.
Industry testing had revealed that retreads would fail approximately
twenty-eight percent of the time on the endurance test and seventeen per-
cent of the time on the high speed test.
In responding to these industry complaints the government pointed out
that retreaders had admitted in the rulemaking proceeding that they might
be able to redesign their tires to do better on the high speed and endur-
ance tests. The retreaders' basic legal claim was that such speculative ad-
missions could not provide the factual predicate for the standard. The re-
quired redesign specifications had not been fully articulated, their cost had
not been analyzed, and the Agency had not determined how long it should
take the retreading industry to begin production of redesigned retreads. In
addition, participants in the rulemaking proceeding had suggested that the
redesign features could themselves produce safety hazards in highway
driving.
In H & H Tire Co. v. Department of Transportation," the reviewing
court agreed with the petitioners that the Agency had failed to justify its
standard adequately. The court was concerned that little evidence existed
in the record to correlate laboratory tests with performance on the road.
Internal NHTSA studies supported these concerns and called for further
research. "Thus," wrote the court, "we cannot conclude from the record
before us that the respondents adequately investigated the practicability of
Standard 117 before issuing it.""
The court was equally unhappy with the Agency's failure to engage in
any economic or cost studies with respect to the promulgated standards:
[Tihe respondent seems to overlook the fact that, if economic analysis
were to show that retreaders would suffer severe economic hardship,
53. 49 C.F.R. § 571.117 (1972).
54. 49 C.F.R. § 571.109 (1986).
55. 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972).
56. Id. at 355.
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either by being forced out of business or by being priced out of their
market, the retreaders' customers would also suffer. . . . In their
responses to the notice, some retreaders stated that purchasers of re-
treads are often persons who cannot afford new tires or who, because
of the expense of new tires, continue to use worn out tires much
longer than they, in safety, should. The Safety Act explicitly recog-
nizes that tires may be new or retreaded. This certainly militates
against the idea that Congress intended to authorize the respondent
to narrow the selection of alternatives available to consumers when
they decide to buy automobile tires ...
We do not minimize the desirability of all reasonable and practi-
cable steps for the diminution of highway carnage. That, of course,
could be accomplished by the elimination of all privately owned
automobiles. We do not understand that Congress had that in
mind. 57
The demands of H & H Tire sound eminently sensible. After all,
NHTSA's interest should be in on-the-road performance. And what is to
be said for a standard that might decrease safety through the imposition of
unknown additional costs on consumers? Hadn't the Agency simply failed,
in the Auto Parts vernacular, "to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and
irrationality" that attended its regulatory task? Perhaps. But from the
Agency's perspective the opinion revealed a thorough misunderstanding
both of NHTSA's powers and of the practical necessities of technology-
forcing. If NHTSA needed on-the-road evidence of safety effects before it
could regulate, how could it require anything new? Didn't the court un-
derstand that imposing new and more costly technologies always extended
the useful life of old ones by providing economic incentives for their con-
tinued use, and that there was always a safety loss in the transition period
as consumers continued to use worn out equipment? And how was
NHTSA to respond to these claims of excessive cost? Only manufacturers
had the cost data; they refused to disclose it and NHTSA had no statutory
power to require disclosure."
On the same day that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals struck
down the retreaded tire performance standards in H & H Tire, the Sixth
Circuit in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation,59 enjoined
the implementation of the Agency's passive restraints standard. Although
retreaded tires might be considered peripheral to the Agency's overall
57. Id. (citation omitted).
58. This particular defect was remedied by an amendment to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Act requiring the disclosure of cost data by any manufacturer objecting to a regulation on the grounds
of cost. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492, § 105, 88
Stat. 1470, 1481 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1982)).
59. 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
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vehicle safety program, the passive restraints rule was at the core of the
enterprise. Reducing the effects of the "second collision" was the major
articulated rationale for the 1966 Act. 60 Providing restraint systems that
cushion impacts automatically, and hence are "passive," carried forward
the legislation's basic public health strategy. Moreover, the projected life-
saving and injury-reducing potential of passive restraints eclipsed that
claimed for all the Agency's other safety standards combined.
It would be easy, nevertheless, to minimize the importance of the Sixth
Circuit's holding in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation.
The court rejected Chrysler's basic objection, that passive
restraints-airbags in particular-had not been demonstrated to be "prac-
ticable" in highway use. NHTSA surely took great solace from statements
such as "the Agency is empowered to issue safety standards which require
improvements in existing technology or which require the development of
new technology, and it is not limited to issuing standards based solely on
devices already fully developed.""' The "bad law" in the Seventh Circuit
seemed to be paired with some "good law" in the Sixth. Indeed, the
Agency lost in Chrysler on the narrow ground that its criteria for anthro-
pomorphic test dummies were incomplete and that, therefore, the passive
restraints standard currently lacked the "objective performance criteria"
required by the Act.
Yet Chrysler was a managerial and political disaster that has haunted
NHTSA's regulatory efforts to the present day. Properly understood it
was also a doctrinal calamity. For, cheerful general language aside, the
Sixth Circuit's legal posture on technology-forcing was not really so dif-
ferent from the Seventh Circuit's view in H & H Tire. The court's appar-
ent broad approval of technology-forcing must be taken in context. The
airbag was not yet generally on the road, but it was hardly a vague idea
either. As the court noted:
We need not detail here the immense amount of factual data con-
tained in the record relevant to this issue; suffice it to here observe
that present systems demonstrate considerable sophistication over
earlier prototypes. In addition, several automobile manufacturers
and several airbag developers have expressed a great deal of confi-
dence in their present systems and an equal confidence that present
developmental research programs will eliminate any obstacles which
may presently remain.62
60. See supra note 4.
61. 472 F.2d at 673.
62. Id.
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Indeed, the court's language understated the road-readiness of the
airbag. Alone among major manufacturers, General Motors was not a
plaintiff in Chrysler. For good reason. GM had already announced that it
would include airbags as standard equipment in all 1975 GM passenger
cars and light trucks. Several major non-automotive manufacturers, who
were actively competing to be the major suppliers of airbag systems and
components, also claimed to have production-ready systems. And Ford,
which was a plaintiff, had just delivered a fleet of two hundred airbag-
equipped cars to the Allstate Insurance Company.
In these circumstances, the level of technology-forcing ratified by the
court was hardly very radical. That ratification also had to be read in
conjunction with the court's refusal to allow the Agency to put the burden
of final development of the test dummy on the industry. Since the Agency
has a minuscule research budget, and virtually all automotive technology
development (including that of performance testing devices) goes on
within the industry, the Agency's power to force technology may have
been simultaneously confirmed and rejected. As the dissenting member of
the Sixth Circuit panel argued in vain to his brethren:
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the most potent weapon in
the Agency's arsenal to achieve motor vehicle safety is its power,
conferred by the Act, to compel the industry to develop new technol-
ogy through the issuance of motor vehicle safety standards. Yet, if
the rationale of the majority is adopted, industry is in effect relieved
from the responsibility of developing a concomitant part of new
automotive safety technology since without a previously developed
testing device and procedure the Agency is powerless to press indus-
try toward this end.6"
Chrysler not only denied the Agency its most potent weapon, it enor-
mously enhanced the power of the defensive strategy that the industry had
adopted in both rulemaking and judicial proceedings-the full court press.
The "inadequate-dummy" claim was but one of scores thrown at the
Agency in the passive restraints proceeding, each backed by such data and
argument as a massive industry, with its army of engineers and lawyers,
could marshal. Under the Auto Parts formula the Agency was required to
respond to each argument. This required responsiveness was surely bur-
densome. Properly understood, Chrysler multiplied that burden many
times, for the case suggested that every objection should be given equal
rebuttal effort whatever its intrinsic merit.
In order to understand the strategic effect of Chrysler, one must
appreciate that, before the case was briefed and argued, the notion that
63. Id. at 692 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the reviewing court would buy the dummy argument seemed preposter-
ous. The objection was that NHTSA had not specified all the dummy's
performance characteristics. But this could in no way prejudice the manu-
facturers. So long as their passive restraints systems performed acceptably
using a dummy having the characteristics specified in the rule, they com-
plied with Standard 208. Manufacturers literally could give the dummy
any additional characteristics they desired, including characteristics specif-
ically engineered to produce compliance and having no relation to the pre-
dicted post-crash behavior of human bodies. Further refinements in
dummy technology were slated for later incorporation in the Standard.
Meanwhile, the manufacturers in Chrysler were complaining about a gap
in the rule that gave them engineering discretion and potentially eased
their compliance burden.
Notwithstanding these plain facts, the petitioners somehow convinced
the court that the gaps in the dummy criteria made the standard non-
objective and performance testing non-repeatable. In its technical context,
therefore, the Chrysler decision announced sotto voce that anything could
happen on any issue. And, in hindsight, the three scant pages devoted to
this issue in the Agency's 122-page brief seemed a major tactical blunder.
Rather than simply pointing out the obvious, that the manufacturers were
arguing against themselves and that their demand for "full specification"
of the dummy in performance terms was impossible in any event, the
agency perhaps should have filled the brief with detail from the rulemak-
ing proceeding on the technical niceties of dummy construction. Perhaps
that would have convinced the court that NHTSA had done all that was
possible to achieve a complete and objective specification. But even then
the argument may not have succeeded. For the Chrysler decision might
also be read to demand completion of all planned research and develop-
ment activity on a standard before promulgating it in any form. To admit
that there are gaps to be filled as technological understanding increases is
to admit that the technical basis for the standard is inadequate.
From the manufacturers' standpoint, finding a gap, or many gaps, in
any regulation should be child's play. Moreover, automakers need only
point out these technological inadequacies and give them some credibility
to force the Agency to document the technical merits of any detail in its
standards. This is a full court press under conditions that recall an old
basketball verity: Five players can never beat six if one of the six is wear-
ing a striped shirt and using a whistle. But in this game the player ratios
are probably on the order of 10:1 rather than 6:5.
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C. The Agency Chastened
This apocalyptic reading of the early cases is, obviously, not necessary.
Yet there is evidence both that NHTSA tended to read the cases this way
and that it did so with some justification. Comprehensive oversight hear-
ings on NHTSA's stewardship of the vehicle safety program were called
before the Senate Commerce Committee less than two years after
Chrysler. A principal focus of those hearings was the tardy pace of
NHTSA rulemaking. Time and again, the Agency responded to its critics
that prompt action was not possible, indeed was likely to be dysfunctional,
given the requirements of judicial review.
Listen as the Agency's Administrator describes his plight:
We are the men in the middle in the adversary situation that has
developed. We propose something. We are criticized on the one
hand, with some support from the Committee, saying we are going
too slow. The industry on the other hand is in there fighting and
saying we are going too fast. We are trying to carry out our statu-
tory responsiblities to get safety in these vehicles. . . . The only
thing is that you and some of the critics say we are going too slow.
We say we are going with what the Administrative [Procedure] Act
permits us to do.6'
Such generalities were hardly satisfying to safety partisans who pressed
the Agency constantly on specific issues. In connection with the Agency's
work on Standard 208, for example, Administrator Gregory testified:
We have not rushed into decisionmaking because, despite the
charges of certain critics, the key factors are not all known. There is
a difference between advocacy, which pushes to achieve some action
desired by the advocate and the final action of the statutorily respon-
sible public official. The public official must understand all the key
data and the various points of view, make his decision and then
accept responsibility for his action. The same does not hold true for
the advocate. Dispute is probably inevitable when one is dealing
with an issue like passive restraints.
We want to insure, insofar as possible, since the industry took us
to court before on this standard, that further delay will not be occa-
sioned by new court challenges.65
64. Motor Vehicle Safety Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 86 (1974) (statement of Dr. James Gregory, Administrator, NHTSA).
65. Id. at 76 (statement of Administrator Gregory).
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As the Agency's sensitivity to judicial review in the aftermath of the
Chrysler decision came up repeatedly and in different contexts, the ex-
changes, particularly between Senator Hartke and the Chief Counsel, be-
came more pointed. But the latter stoutly maintained that the Agency's
view of its legal situation was realistic:
Hartke: Can you push the state of the art forward by proposing a
rule [that cars be designed so that their occupants would survive a 50
mile per hour barrier crash], or does that run into the legal
question?
Schneider: It turns into the legal question when you issue it, if
you cannot support it.
Hartke: Isn't it a lot better to get knocked down by the court than
to concede before you start?
Schneider: No. . . . I can cite two examples. One is a controver-
sial subject where Congress said, "Get it out at a certain time," and
we didn't. . . . A lawsuit was brought, and so what has happened is
that the court has set the effective dates. The case is still pending on
appeal in court, so I really should not go into a lot of detail; but the
long and short of it is that I, personally, feel that the day those regu-
lations ultimately come into effect will have taken much longer be-
cause of the litigation than they would be but for the litigation.
On a more important subject, standard 208, the original delay in
208 was because of the litigation. In other words, the litigation re-
sulted in a decision which led to more work needing to be done be-
cause in the court's judgment the test device was no good. I think
there, again, if you are not on solid ground when you go forward
with these things, you run the risk, great risk, because litigation is
ever increasing, Mr. Chairman, from the industry vis-a-vis DOT.
We run the great risk of the standard ultimately having an effective
date come about at a later time because of court action than it would
have but for court action."
Again, in relation to the Agency's effort to promulgate school bus safety
standards with all deliberate speed, the Chief Counsel testified:
Mr. Chairman, what people say before the committee is fine and
good; but you as a lawyer know full well that it is what is in the
rulemaking record which we lawyers have to take when we are chal-
lenged in court. Everything we do say today, it seems, results in
being challenged in court. We have to have support in the record.
What they say to you privately, the school bus manufacturers are not
saying in the rulemaking record.67
66. Id. at 109-10 (statement of Lawrence Schneider, Chief Counsel, NHTSA).
67. Id. at 84.
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And in relation to NHTSA's overall schedule for rulemaking actions, Ad-
ministrator Gregory stated in a letter to Chairman Magnuson dated Feb-
ruary 15, 1974, a copy of which was submitted to the hearing record:
Mr. Chairman, I too share your concern in what often appears to
be unnecessary delays in rulemaking actions. In establishing these
dates, however, I think it must be recognized that should we move
without a strong engineering position; without proper considerations
for cost and lead time; or, without adequate benefit cost information,
we are vulnerable to court actions which would result in longer de-
lays. . . 68
Such testimony is obviously self-serving and should be discounted ac-
cordingly. Yet, it is far from clear that Gregory and Schneider should be
viewed as excessively timid. They were having a lot of trouble in court in
addition to H & H Tire and Chrysler. Whereas in those cases the Agency
had been reversed for failing to respond effectively to the substance of
manufacturers' complaints, in Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe," the Sec-
retary was reversed because the final rule was modified to take account of
manufacturers' objections without providing a further opportunity for af-
fected parties to comment on the modified form of the rule.
In addition to the Catch-22 aspects of combining these "substantive"
and procedural decisions-non-responsiveness is irrational and responsive-
ness is procedurally improper-Wagner Electric added further burdens of
uncertain magnitude to the rulemaking process. With no reliable method
for discerning what issues raised by participants might be treated as im-
portant by reviewing courts, or what changes in a proposal would be con-
sidered sufficiently substantial to require another round of notice and
comment, NHTSA could hardly be faulted for taking a very cautious ap-
proach to rejecting either manufacturers' substantive arguments or their
requests for further proceedings to explore new or modified issues. The
manufacturers' full court press on rulemaking proposals, which also in-
cluded constant petitions for amendment, interpretation, or waiver of ex-
isting rules, was being reinforced procedurally as well as substantively by
judicial review. And the offensive team had a very thin bench. Under
these circumstances they might appear to be stalling for time while run-
ning, passing, and dribbling with all the energy they could muster.
Later cases have tended to confirm, rather than ameliorate the Agency's
difficulties. NHTSA's attempts to redeem the general technology-forcing
power alluded to in the majority opinion in Chrysler have seldom been
68. Id. at 28.
69. 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
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successful.7 0 The fate of one of NHTSA's more ambitious technology-
forcing endeavors-an attempt to mandate improvements in the safe brak-
ing capacity of large trucks-is instructive. The legal forcing device was
wonderfully simple. The regulation7 1 merely required that trucks be capa-
ble of stopping from 60 miles per hour on a specified road surface within
a certain number of feet without "wheel lock-ups" or "jacknifing". The
regulation's accident-avoidance goal was also straightforward. In the
words of the reviewing court, "[c]ommon sense would seem to indicate
that when two types of vehicles of widely divergent size share the same
roadway, and the larger, heavier vehicle has a much longer stopping dis-
tance, any situation which requires emergency braking is potentially dis-
astrous to the smaller automobile and its passengers.
72
However, the only technology that would satisfy this requirement was
an antilock braking system (ABS), a complex, computer-assisted device
that was used on most commercial aircraft, but was then available only on
some limited-production surface vehicles. When the ABS technology was
forcibly moved from limited to mass production, reliability problems sur-
faced almost immediately. In response to numerous petitions, NHTSA
continually relaxed and reformulated the standard. The problems never-
theless persisted. Indeed, some spot checks by fleet owners suggested that
the failure rate of the systems might exceed fifty percent.7"
Responding to a manufacturer's claim that the persistent evidence of
unreliability made it essential for NHTSA to study thoroughly the relia-
bility of the ABS device in use, the Court of Appeals in PACCAR, Inc. v.
70. In National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974), for
example, the standard at issue required that retreaded tires have permanently affixed to their side-
walls information concerning seven characteristics of the tires. These included the tire's size, its maxi-
mum inflation pressure, its maximum load, the number of plys, an indication that it was a "tube-
type" or "tubeless" tire, and the words "bias/belted" or the word "radial" depending on the tire's
construction. Tire retreaders objected to these requirements because the variation in tire casings that
they received for retreading, combined with the hot vulcanizing process for retreading tires, would
make the inclusion of this information laborious and time-consuming. Tires would have to be heated
and cooled several times in order to get all this information molded into their sidewalls. One retreader
submitted information suggesting that, on the basis of an experiment it had run, the price of its
retreaded tires would have to be increased about 30% in order to achieve reasonable compliance with
the standard's requirements. NHTSA's only response to such submissions was a suggestion that re-
treaders might be able to sort tires into uniform lots which would reduce the cost of compliance
significantly, coupled with the invocation of Chrysler's suggestion that the Agency was not responsible
for demonstrating exactly how and at what cost manufacturers could comply.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals viewed the Agency's response as entirely inadequate.
The opinion characterized NHTSA's statements as "unsupported and unconvincing assertions." Id. at
40. Nor in the court's words was "the Secretary's statement of the reasons for his conclusion that the
requirements are practicable ...so inherently plausible that the court can accept it on the agency's
mere ipse dixit." Id.
71. 49 C.F.R. § 571.121 (1972).
72. PACCAR, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 573 F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1979).
73. Id. at 642.
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration found the Agency's data
base totally inadequate to support retention of the standard.7' It enjoined
implementation of the stopping distance requirements until the agency
could develop evidence that the braking systems required would decrease
rather than increase the danger to the public. Shades of H & H Tire.
In addition, the PACCAR court invalidated the testing requirements
under Standard 121."1 The stopping distances specified by the rule were
for a specific road surface with skid numbers of 75 and 30.7' The court
agreed with the petitioners that the testing requirements were impractica-
ble for several reasons. For one thing, the skid numbers used were based
on a mathematical calculation that assumed the use of a particular tire
which was no longer produced. Other tires produced different results.
At a more basic level the court agreed with the petitioners that it was
impossible to maintain a road surface at a particular skid number. Fluctu-
ations in skid numbers on a given road surface meant that manufacturers
would have to overcompensate by testing their vehicles on road surfaces
substantially slicker than the regulations required in order to assure that
the vehicles would perform as required when tested. The court rejected
NHTSA's assurance that it would test trucks on a substantially stickier
surface than the regulation required, thus allowing a margin for surface
variances, saying "these informal assurances are not enough. Manufactur-
ers are entitled to testing criteria that they can rely upon with
certainty. ' 7
7
PACCAR is a peculiar and, for NHTSA, a frustrating case. The
Agency obviously had not operated with the degree of scientific or engi-
neering precision that, abstractly considered, one would like to expect.
Yet, as the PACCAR court noted, "There is much in the Standard that
has long been needed for highway safety, and it is undisputed that the
antilock device, when perfected, will advance that goal. We are also aware
that some manufacturers have expended a great deal of time, energy, and
money over the last six years, in attempting to produce vehicles to comply,
and that they have, to a large degree, been successful." 78
74. NHTSA conceded that there had been problems, but it pointed to its continuous revision of
the standard as evidence of its responsiveness to new data. While PACCAR claimed that trucks with
unreliable ABS systems were now less safe than they had been previously, the agency noted that it
had received not a single confirmed report of an accident caused by ABS failure. NHTSA further
noted that it had road tested three ABS equipped trucks for three months and had encountered no
problems. Id. at 643.
75. Id.
76. The skid number represents the degree of friction between the tire and the road surface and is
therefore a quantitative measure of the slickness of the road. The number 75 represents a dry road
while the number 30 represents a wet road.
77. 573 F.2d at 644.
78. Id. at 643.
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In short, the Agency had been engaged in technology-forcing which
placed the requirements for innovation and experimentation firmly on the
automotive industry. It had been partially, perhaps mostly, successful, but
had not quite achieved the degree of reliability needed. Yet, on judical
review, the Agency discovers that its responsiveness over time to new data
and industry petitions will be viewed not as a sensible incremental ap-
proach, but rather as evidence that it did not know what it was doing.
Moreover, the Agency is required to demonstrate practicability in use in a
legal context that almost certainly destroys its capacity to do so. After
PACCAR, when truck manufacturers no longer have any obligation to
comply with the standard, how is the Agency to develop the comprehen-
sive data on road performance necessary to sustain its regulation? Unless
truck manufacturers and operators voluntarily cooperate with the Agency
by installing and maintaining expensive devices that they obviously wish
to avoid, that data can never become available. The court seems to be
demanding data that its opinion renders unobtainable.
The PACCAR court's approach to the testing standard must have been
equally distressing. According to Chrysler, the statute's "objectivity"
requirement applies to testing criteria as well as to safety standards. The
Agency, therefore, was virtually forced to adopt the "stickiness coefficient"
approach, notwithstanding its known and irremediable variability. There
simply was no other way to specify an objective performance criterion.
The problem was that the criteria were very difficult to satisfy. Hence
NHTSA did the only thing it could do. It recognized the problem explic-
itly and gave assurances that it would not test trucks for compliance pur-
poses on a surface whose variance might penalize a conscientious manu-
facturer. But this promise was held to be an "impracticable" guarantee
for manufacturers who are entitled to criteria "that they can rely upon
with certainty" in doing their own testing. Another Catch 22: the "practi-
cable" is non-objective and the "objective" is impracticable.
D. A Preliminary Assessment
Our discussion thus far has viewed the decisions of reviewing courts
primarily through the lens of their strategic effects on NHTSA's capacity
to promulgate safety standards. We should reverse the telescope momenta-
rily to observe the view from the bench. The courts that have reviewed
NHTSA's rules might be seen merely to be holding the Agency to pre-
cisely those aspirations of scientific objectivity and rationality that underlie
the epidemiological perspective on safety regulation. Reviewing courts
have required that the Agency get the facts, analyze them in a sophisti-
cated fashion, and adopt policies that are closely connected to these factual
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and analytical predicates. Courts also have required that the Agency be
sensitive to the limitations or subsidiary purposes included in its governing
legislation. NHTSA has not been permitted to pursue automobile safety
at any cost.
Put in this way, the position of the judiciary seems straightforward and
sensible. The 1966 Act, after all, is predicated on a vision of scientific
rationality. Nor should Congress be imagined to have desired significant
disruption of the automobile industry or automobile utilization when it
instructed the Agency to pursue its safety goals. The statute, after all, says
that the Agency should eliminate "unreasonable risks." Its standards are
required to be "objective" and "appropriate" to the type of vehicle in-
volved, as well as "practicable".
This interpretation is reinforced by the even-handedness of the judici-
ary when the Agency shifted in the 1980's to an active program of deregu-
lation. The most important decision was Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co.7 19 Without here detailing the tortuous regulatory path of FMVSS
208, suffice it to say that the passive restraints standard invalidated in the
Chrysler case was subsequently finalized,80 then withdrawn," then reis-
sued8" and approved on judicial review,8" and then rescinded by Secretary
Andrew Lewis in the first Reagan Administration. 4 It was review of that
rescission order that reached the Supreme Court in State Farm.
Secretary Lewis's rescission was premised on findings, first, that auto-
mobile manufacturers would comply with the standard as then written by
installing "passive belts" rather than airbags and, second, that the passive
belt might well not provide any greater safety benefits than the "active"
belt currently required to be installed because those belts could be de-
tached easily by automobile occupants. The former finding was based
upon the automobile industry's submissions to the Secretary; the latter on
79. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
80. 39 Fed. Reg. 10,271 (1974) (reciting agency finding that test dummy now specified in suffi-
ciently objective terms to satisfy conditions of Chrysler remand).
81. Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman initiated a further rulemaking on the issue
of the passive restraint requirement. 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 (1976). Based on NHTSA's anticipation of
widespread public resistance, Secretary Coleman proposed a demonstration project to encourage pub-
lic acceptance; promulgation of the mandatory standard was left for a later, unspecified date. Dept. of
Transportation, The Secretary's Decision Concerning Motor Vehicle Occupant Crash Protection (De-
cember 6, 1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 5071 (1977) (briefly explaining Secretary's decision).
82. Modified Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1978).
83. Pacific Legal Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 830 (1979).
84. Citing the economic difficulties of the auto industry, Lewis proposed a revision of the entire
standard. 46 Fed. Reg. 21,205 (1981). After a comment period, NHTSA issued a final rule (Notice
25) which rescinded the passive restraint requirement in Modified Standard 208. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419
(1981).
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the Agency's lack of any significant data indicating how motorists would
respond to detachable passive belts.
The Court voiced two main concerns:"6 First, the Secretary had not
explained why, if detachable passive belts caused problems of disengage-
ment, Standard 208 should not be rewritten to require that the perform-
ance standard be met either by the installation of air bags or by the instal-
lation of nondetachable passive belts. 8  Second, the Court could not
understand why the Secretary believed that a detachable passive belt
would function in the same way as a manual or active belt. For, the Court
reasoned, so long as the passive belt was not detached by the occupant, it
would operate without any action on the part of the driver or passenger.
Hence, inertia favored usage rather than, as with active belts, nonusage.
The Court could therefore not understand why the agency predicted that
detachable passive belts might function much like active belts.87
The Secretary was not faulted for the fact that the data available to him
were uncertain on this question, but instead for an apparent inexplicable
leap from uncertainty to a behavioral prediction. The Court 8 clearly
85. Much of the Supreme Court's opinion dealt with the appropriate scope of review for the
revocation, as distinguished from the promulgation, of a rule. In the end the Court resolved these
questions in favor of exercising precisely the same scope of review for revocations as for promulgations
or amendments. 463 U.S. at 41. The Court basically asked itself whether the Secretary's rationale
made sense in its own terms and whether the factual predicate to sustain it was sufficient. It found the
Secretary's explanation inadequate and his failure to develop a better factual record arbitrary.
86. 463 U.S. at 46.
87. Id. at 51.
88. The District of Columbia Circuit took a similar view in Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93
(D.C. Cir. 1984). At issue was NHTSA's suspension of its tire tread-wear grading requirements.
These requirements had been twice issued by the Agency. The first issuance was enjoined by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals at the suit of certain tire manufacturers on the familiar ground that
the Agency's test procedures had certain technical difficulties. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of
Transp., 541 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1976). NHTSA then revised the regulations and reissued them
excluding radial tires from the requirements because the problems with the methodology for measur-
ing wear rates in radial tires had not been solved adequately. Following another judicial challenge by
the tire manufacturers, the rule was upheld. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of Transp., 592 F.2d
322 (6th Cir. 1979).
In 1983, however, the Agency proposed to suspend the tread-wear grading requirements entirely on
the grounds that it must do so "to avoid dissemination of potentially misleading tire information to
consumers," as well as "to minimize the imposition of unwarranted compliance cost on industry and
consumers." 48 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1983). The Agency's proposed suspension notice listed several tenta-
tive sources of data variability that a review of test data at its San Angelo test grounds had revealed.
In reviewing this suspension, the D.C. Circuit found that the test variability problems actuating
NHTSA's concern in 1983 were precisely the same problems it had rejected as not seriously under-
mining its tests in 1975 and 1978. Indeed, NHTSA had insisted previously that those test procedures
produced "reasonably fair and reasonably reliable grading procedures" and that the Act did not re-
quire that it achieve "theoretical perfection." The Agency's argument in that regard had been adopted
explicitly by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals when upholding the treadwear rule. B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Department of Transp., 541 F.2d 1178, 1189 (6th Cir. 1976).
The D.C. Circuit then overturned the Agency's suspension order on two grounds:
First, the record does not support NHTSA's finding that the magnitude of the variability
problem justified suspending the tread-wear rating requirements, rather than retaining them
while improvements in the test procedures and in the manufacturers' grade assignment
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believed that the rational response to uncertainty was to seek further in-
formation, meanwhile maintaining the status quo.89
The Supreme Court clearly understood that a political preference for
deregulation had in part motivated the actions under review in State
Farm. When combined with the cases reviewing the promulgation of rules
the decisions reveal, therefore, that neither regulation nor deregulation can
be supported by hunch, conjecture, or ideology. The Agency has been al-
lowed to pursue neither safety nor regulatory relief without thoroughly
justifying its actions in terms of a reliable factual predicate and its statu-
tory mandate. The Agency may operate in a domain beset by factual un-
certainty, but it cannot offer uncertainty as a predicate for its acts. Judi-
cial review of the rationality of administrative rules operates on the
Weberian maxim "Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally
domination through knowledge." 90
These apparently reasonable judicial requirements may nevertheless be
uniquely disabling to an agency having NHTSA's standard-setting man-
date. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act presumes that
at least some standards will be "technology-forcing." NHTSA is supposed
to improve the state of the art in automobile safety design. Yet, it is to do
this by setting performance standards, not design standards. The statute
presumes that the automobile industry will engage in the innovative
practices could be developed. Second, NHTSA failed to explain why alternatives, which the
rulemaking record indicates were available to the agency, could not correct many of the varia-
bility problems that NHTSA ha I identified.
733 F.2d at 99-100.
The court was clearly impatient with the Agency's failure to fully implement provisions of the Act
which, according to congressional instruction, were to be in place no later than 1968. Indeed, the court
waxed apopleptic in its conclusion:
It is hard to imagine a more sorry performance of a congressional mandate than that carried
out by NHTSA and its predecessors under Section 203 of the Act. Between inaction, foot-
dragging, and field reversal, the track record of the agency's performance is very muddy in-
deed. ....
NHTSA's rationale for suspending the treadwear grading requirements read like a "how-
to" manual for the compulsive perfectionist.
733 F.2d at 105.
89. In the Supreme Court's words,
Rescission of the passive restraint requirement would not be arbitrary and capricious simply
because there was no evidence in direct support of the agency's conclusion. It is not infrequent
that the available data do not settle a regulatory issue and the agency must then exercise its
judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record to a policy conclusion.
Recognizing that policymaking in a complex society must account for uncertainty, however,
does not imply that it is sufficient for an agency to merely recite the terms "substantial uncer-
tainty" as a justification for its actions. As previously noted, the agency must explain the evi-
dence which is available, and must offer a "rational connection between facts found and the
choice made." Generally, one aspect of that explanation would be a justification for rescinding
the regulation before engaging in a search for further evidence.
463 U.S. at 52 (citation omitted).
90. 1 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCiETY 225 (G. Roth & C. Wittich ed. 1968).
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engineering necessary to make the automobile operate in accordance with
these performance requirements.
This division of function between the agency and the industry is emi-
nently sensible. 1 Both engineering know-how and the incentives to reduce
compliance costs lie with the industry. Yet the division of responsibility
produces something of a paradox when the agency seeks to justify its re-
quirements. If the agency adopts standards requiring only the use of well-
known and widely-tested safety devices, thus merely writing into perform-
ance criteria language the characteristics of existing designs, it will carry
out only a limited portion of its technology-forcing mandate-a demand
that manufacturers incorporate known and proven safety advances into
their products. But to the extent that NHTSA does more to force technol-
ogy, it will be attempting to speed up a process of experiential and incre-
mental engineering advance. The ultimate success of that endeavor could
not possibly be demonstrable at the time the technology-forcing regulatory
power is exercised."
One must expect, therefore, that not only will there be gaps in the tech-
nical, factual predicate for such standards, there will always be a series of
problems which have not yet been solved and which might make the stan-
dard "inappropriate," "impracticable," and perhaps initially even unsafe,
compared to the status quo. Whether such standards can be justified as a
reasonable exercise of agency judgment may then depend importantly on
circumstances beyond the agency's control, not the least of which will be
manufacturer cooperation in pressing forward experimental safety
projects. In this context, as the dissenting judge in Chrysler recognized,
industry resistance becomes self-validating.
Indeed, present, cogent rationalization may be almost the antithesis of
the behavior required for successful technology-forcing. The only way to
force technology may be to behave "unreasonably"-to demand what can-
not now be done, or what can now be done only at excessive cost."3 A
statement of basis and purpose relying on the folk wisdom that "necessity
91. One should not make too much, however, of the distinction between design and performance
standards. Many automobile safety standards seem merely to translate designs into performance lan-
guage. Moreover, there is no conceptually clean break between the two techniques. See generally
Mills, The Techniques of Automotive Regulation: Performance versus Design Standards, in Gov-
ERNMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 64 (D. Ginsburg ed. 1980) (dis-
cussing relative advantages of each technique).
92. Indeed, candid appraisal of any technology-forcing effort would almost certainly describe it as
deeply problematic. Read the prospectus of a genetic engineering firm. Even with patentable labora-
tory techniques, bringing a product to market is beset by significant uncertainties affecting timing, cost
and marketability. Such investments are not for those who demand assured success or a predictable
income stream.
93. This was in fact the technique Congress adopted when imposing fuel economy and emissions
standards on the automobile industry. L. LINDEN & H. IVERECH, REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE
7-10 (1977).
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is the mother of invention," tempered by the agency's promise to withhold
sanctions if the industry's best efforts fail, may be an essential regulatory
technique. But this is precisely the technique that NHTSA has been de-
nied, explicitly in PACCAR, and implicitly in Chrysler, H & H Tire, and
elsewhere.9 The unhappy position of technology-forcing in the context of
rationality review is but one difficulty with the judicial posture that has
developed in the course of reviewing NHTSA's rules. The "decision pro-
cess" rather than "decision product" cast of judicial review for reasonable-
ness, while it seems restrained and appropriate for "generalist judges" re-
viewing an "expert agency," has even more general, unfortunate
consequences.
First, it invites courts to invalidate reasonable judgments that are badly
explained or perhaps inexplicable in straightforward logical fashion. The
search for a "rational process" tends to collapse incremental learning in
real time-a process that may entail tentative commitments, revised tech-
nical and interpretive perspectives, false starts, lucky guesses, new infor-
mation, or an evolving technological, economic and political environ-
ment-into an analytical exercise of the "If A, then B" sort. This
approach is both pernicious and self-defeating.
It is pernicious because it gives enormous leverage to the status quo,
whether the status quo is no rule, as in PACCAR, or the continuance of a
rule, as in State Farm. The fits, starts, and reversals of real decisionmak-
ing look, from a rational-analytic perspective, like the fumblings of an
incompetent or misguided administrator. It is self-defeating because this
approach to review instrurts administrators to write a rational-analytic
account of their decisions in order to withstand judicial review. If the
courts really are interested in the decision process, they are unlikely to
learn much about it. The current approach to judicial review virtually
assures that no administrator will find it prudent to reveal the agency's
real process of decision."'
94. There is evidence, moreover, that the technology-forcing technique works, at least sometimes,
to produce necessary advances. Recall National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491
F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974), discussed supra note 70. The court there invalidated NHTSA's tire label-
ling requirements because it had failed to demonstrate that they were economically practicable. But
not all of the rule's requirements were nullified. Two requirements had been specified in the statute,
to take effect whenever the Agency adopted a labelling rule. Although those requirements caused the
same compliance difficulties as the other aspects of the rule, the court left them in effect. Why?
Because Congress, unlike regulatory agencies, need not demonstrate that it knows what it is doing; as
the court opined, laconically, "No adminstrative procedure test applies to an act of Congress." 491
F.2d at 37.
Did the price of retread tires then shoot up in the way the retreaders had asserted in the rulemak-
ing proceeding? Not at all. An adhesive manufacturer quickly developed a label that could be affixed
permanently to retreads after the vulcanizing process was complete-at a cost of only 12 cents per
tire.
95. The statement of basis and purpose at issue in State Farm is a classic example. The Agency's
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Second, the process approach leads courts to imagine that remands for
further consideration or explanation have a modest effect on an agency's
regulatory policy choice. Courts, after all, are not judging the reasonable-
ness of the agency's policy; that is for the agency to decide. Judges see
themselves as merely shaping up the process of rational bureaucratic deci-
sionmaking. But this view enormously understimates the potential impact
of a judicial remand, particularly one premised, as most are, on the in-
completeness of the agency's decision process.
Any remand occurs long after the rulemaking docket has been closed
and the staff has been reassigned. Often the remand finds the agency with
a new administrator and a new agenda. The idea that an agency can or
will quickly turn to remedying the factual or analytic defects in its re-
manded rule is surely naive, however minor those problems might appear
in the abstract. Delay will be measured in years, as Chief Counsel Schnei-
der implicitly warned Senator Hartke, not months. And, of course, delay
means that rulemaking will go forward in a new political, economic, and
technological context that will radically alter the perceived rationality of
the rule. Rather than the rule shaping reality, reality will reshape the
rule.
We do not want to wax hyperbolic but, if NHTSA's engineering esti-
mates are to be believed," absent the Chrysler remand tens of thousands
of lives and millions of serious injuries would have been prevented be-
tween 1972 and the present by an evolving passive restraints technology.97
For as we suggested earlier, Chrysler was both a managerial and a politi-
cal disaster.
statement is set forth in technocratic terms that invite reversal. Yet, as the dissenters seem to recog-
nize, the historical basis for NHTSA's risk aversion concerning passive restraints made a convincing
case for the Agency's position. 463 U.S. at 58, 59. For not only had Ronald Reagan accepted a
mandate to do something about overzealous regulation, the Agency's prior experience with the accept-
ability of the passive restraint mechanism suggested the political wisdom of caution. Yet the syllogistic
form of prior instances of judicial review discouraged the Agency from simply laying its cards on the
table.
96. In one of its more conservative estimates NHTSA suggested that 15-year fatality savings
would be 57,000 lives. 49 Fed. Reg. 28,987 (1984). We are not arguing here that those engineering
estimates should be believed. The factors influencing the highway death rate include the age distribu-
tion of the driving population, the spatial distribution of driving, the range of distribution of the
weights of vehicles on the road, the distribution of speeds, the use of alcohol, the safety of highway
structures, changes in the availability and quality of emergency and long-term medical care, changes
in vehicle occupancy rates, changes in the distribution of daytime and nighttime driving, and so on.
Looking at the long-term trends on injuries and fatalities, the only innovation that seems to have had
a clear, marked and immediate effect on automobile injuries and deaths was the introduction of the
national 55 mile per hour speed limit in early 1974. We simply do not know whether NHTSA
regulation has had the effect claimed for it or whether the passive restraints rule would have had
those effects. Yet, the most careful second generation studies of the impact of safety regulation suggest
that safety equipment has produced a reduction in the incidence of injury and death. See REGULAT-
ING THE AUTOMOILE, supra note 9, at 53, 54.
97. Claybrook & Bollier, supra note 30, at 101 n.94, 122 n.233.
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The managerial disaster was in general terms merely the internal re-
flection of the strategic weaknesses that judicial review exacerbated. If
courts focus on gaps in the record or in the rulemaking analysis, agencies
will learn to do so also. The standard bureaucratic response to hostility in
the external environment is to replicate the threat internally in order to
make anything issued by the agency completely defensible. Lawyers, econ-
omists, and engineers can be assigned to "flyspeck" the rulemaking record
and to "remand" it within the agency for revision prior to promulgation.98
1
98. Internal changes at NHTSA from 1975 to 1980 strongly suggest that the Agency was engaged
in a process of replicating external conflict concerning safety standards. These changes include refor-
mation of the rulemaking process and realignment of professionals (engineers, lawyers, economists,
and policy analysts) participating in that process.
NHTSA in the mid-1970's was pictured as an Agency "dominated" by engineers. See Pruitt, Peo-
ple Doing What They Do Best: The Professional Engineers and NHTSA, 39 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 363
(1979) (based on interviews conducted in 1976). The early priority given safety standards was attrib-
uted to engineers' professional biases and to their capture of transient political appointees who served
as administrator. Id. at 367-68.
The Agency's internal rulemaking procedures support this depiction. NHTSA, Order 800-1
(1972). The original procedures, issued in 1972, vested almost exclusive rulemaking authority in the
Agency's chief rulemaking engineer, the Associate Administrator for Motor Vehicle Programs
(MVP), who was "responsible for developing motor vehicle safety standards and for ensuring that
proposed standards comply with the substantive goals of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act." Other agency officials were authorized to participate in the rulemaking process, and to
concur in or dissent from proposed rules, but the order gave little content or force to this review
function. The order set strict limits on the time available for comment, and the "Coordination Panel,"
where all parties convened to exchange views on proposed rules, was dominated by engineers. Under
the terms of the original order, engineers were responsible for taking the initiative in all substantive
phases of rulemaking, including obtaining the Administrator's permission to commit Agency resources
to a proposal; formulating the rule; and incorporating or disregarding changes proposed by other
agency staff during the internal rev; w and comment period.
In February, 1977, the 800-1 order was revised. The new Order stressed that the Administrator,
not the chief rulemaking engineer was in charge of the rulemaking apparatus. In contrast to his
previous plenary role, the rulemaking engineer was responsible primarily for preparing "rulemaking
support papers." The new Order gave cost/benefit analysts and policy analysts under the Associate
Administrator for Planning and Evaluation (P & E) a new and major role in the rulemaking process.
In a memorandum accompanying the new order, the Administrator made clear that such analysts
would have "the most significant role, both in inceptional planning and pending rulemaking, in taking
a lead as independent questioner and critic to assure that all available alternatives are fully flushed
out and considered. . . . P & E must bring independent and objective scrutiny to these matters."
We were told that the revised order was designed to free the Administrator from captivity of Motor
Vehicle Programs by terminating that group's largely exclusive claim upon rulemaking decisions. The
new Order also preserved the role of attorneys as independent critics in the rulemaking process.
There is evidence that these new procedures fostered considerable discontent among engineers al-
most from the moment of their adoption. In a 1980 memorandum entitled Why I Am Losing My Hair,
the agency's new chief rulemaker, who until 1978 had been the chief policy planner and cost/benefit
analyst, addressed the "festering" "current of discontent" among his staff. He specifically cited the
prevailing notion among engineers that lawyers and economists "exist to harass us" and "continually
raise issues that are without merit or fail to understand our analyses." The chief rulemaker disagreed.
"If they do come up with an analysis that terminates a rulemaking action, you should be overjoyed,"
he reminded his staff. "If P&P and OCC find reasons to kill a regulation, imagine the never ending
number of petitions you would have had to manage were it issued." Memorandum from Associate
Administrator for Rulemaking to All Rulemaking Staff (Feb. 1, 1980) (on file with the authors).
Today, former heads of Policy and Evaluation hold the posts of both Associate Administrator for
Research and Development and Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.
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It will be only natural for that staff to become more risk averse than the
judiciary that poses the outside threat. For the staff's job is to clear up any
problem that might generate judicial concern-and any gap or lack of per-
suasiveness might. Even a modest judicial demand for an adequate reason-
ing process can translate into bureaucratic paralysis, unless sufficient
counterweights are pressing agency initiatives forward. Any
counterweights at NHTSA have obviously had insufficient heft. The
agency lacks the institutional resources to live up to the legal system's
expectations for rational bureaucratic behavior.
More importantly, the lessons of Chrysler and H & H Tire came at a
time when the agency was moving toward a radical shift in its rulemaking
approach. As a first step, it was in the process of folding many of its
equipment specific standards into a more general, performance-based oc-
cupant protection format, based importantly on the model of the FMVSS
208 barrier crash criterion."' When Standard 208 was remanded, activity
on half a dozen other rules had to be suspended.' The standard's fate
apparently derailed a second, much bolder, step. NHTSA was contem-
plating a rulemaking approach similar to the simple fifty miles per hour
crash test that Hartke inquired about in the 1974 Senate Commerce Com-
mittee hearings. The idea was to abandon all equipment- or design-
specific crashworthiness criteria in favor of a simple demand for
"survivability" of occupants in a barrier crash of a predetermined
speed.' 0 ' Manufacturers would be allowed to achieve compliance in any
fashion they chose.
The strategic advantages of this radical approach were obvious. No
longer would NHTSA bear the burden of demonstrating the practicability
and reasonableness of particular changes in vehicle design in the face of a
blizzard of industry complaints based on the multiplicity of NHTSA's
proposals regarding other aspects of the design and production of vehicles
composed of fifteen thousand parts. The standard would instead be
phrased as a simple performance goal. Manufacturers could change any
and every component or system in the vehicle, or any process relating to
99. NATIONAl. HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAM PLAN FOR MOTOR
VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS 7 (1971).
100. See Amendments to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966: Hearings
Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce (pt. 1), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 362-69 (1973) (statement of Secretary of Transportation
Brinegar) (detailing the reasons for delay of promulgation of various rules initially proposed in 1970).
101. NATIONAL. HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 99, at 7-9, 10
(agency will move toward "specifying occupant crash protection requirements on a total system per-
formance basis," with frontal collision speed eventually raised to fifty miles per hour; current safety
standards to be rendered obsolete).
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its production, in order to achieve that goal. The burden of technological
innovation would be theirs.
The potential incompatibility of this strategy with what the courts
seemed to be demanding was also obvious. Even if NHTSA could point to
a prototype safety car that would meet the fifty miles per hour standard,
which seemed well within reach, it would be unable to demonstrate that
its safety car was economically practicable to produce and market, or that
the manufacturers could duplicate the safety car's performance in vehicles
that were. Even if believed to be technologically feasible, therefore, this
new direction for rulemaking seemed legally impossible. PACCAR con-
firmed the pessimistic predictions made on the basis of Chrysler and
H&H Tire. And, without recourse to a general performance standard,
there was no managerial game plan for breaking the rulemaking staff
through the industry's full court press. The standard-setting process
stagnated.
These legal difficulties might, of course, have been overcome by new
infusions of statutory power or by massive increases in appropriations and
staffing limits. But the political disaster that followed in the wake of
Chrysler radically reduced the Agency's political capital and further rein-
forced the retreat from rulemaking. NHTSA's political problems were
not, of course, the direct result of the Chrysler opinion. That decision
merely served as a "but for" cause-"For the lack of a nail. . .. ."-for
events that rapidly took on their own special dynamic.
Briefly, the story is as follows. The Chrysler remand did not invalidate
all of FMVSS 208. It left in effect one compliance option, which now
became mandatory-connecting existing seat and shoulder belts to an ig-
nition interlock that would prevent the car from starting unless the belts
were engaged. This device was not only possible with off-the-shelf tech-
nology, it was also cheap. It promised a massive increase in seatbelt utili-
zation, and one manufacturer even had market survey data suggesting that
consumers thought the interlock desirable. Hence, NHTSA left the inter-
lock requirement in effect pending the proposed revision of Standard 208
to reinstitute the passive restraint requirement. The interlock even sur-
vived judicial review."'
But it did not survive long in the marketplace. Attached first in the fall
of 1973 to model year 1974 vehicles, the interlock generated a quantity of
hate mail to the Ninety-Third Congress reminiscent of the outcry follow-
ing Richard Nixon's removal of Archibald Cox as Special Prosecutor dur-
ing the Watergate investigation. By August, 1974, Congress repealed the
102. Ford Motor Co. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 473 F.2d 1241, 1244 (6th Cir.
1973).
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interlock requirement, forbade its readoption, and attached a legislative
veto to any reissuance of FMVSS 208.103 In the process, congressmen
competed vigorously with each other to express the appropriate level of
moral outrage at NHTSA's invasion of motorists' personal liberty. The
agency was vilified as "big brother"''° and characterized as "un-Ameri-
can;"' °5  its interlock requirement was ridiculed as "asinine," ' 0  a
"nightmare."107 Such political lessons are not soon forgotten. Indeed,
although we cannot recount the full story here, the search for "public
acceptability" has since 1974 been a primary criterion guiding NHTSA's
rulemaking activities.
E. Judging Defects
Before speculating about the bases for the observed, and seemingly dis-
abling, judicial approach to review of NHTSA's regulations, it will be
useful to contrast that line of cases with NHTSA's experience in court
when seeking to force the recall of automobiles containing a "defect that
relates to motor vehicle safety."' 08
United States v. General Motors Corp. (wheels)'0 9 is a good example
of the degree to which the judiciary has eased the agency's enforcement
burden in recall cases. There NHTSA had ordered General Motors to
recall a number of its 1960 through 1965 model year, three-quarter ton,
Chevrolet and GMC pickup trucks because of a large number of failures
in a particular type of wheel used on those models. General Motors did
not deny that a significant number of failures had occurred, but urged that
the failures would not occur if the vehicles were operated in accordance
with the owners' manual. General Motor's claim was that the wheel fail-
ures were the result of significant overloading of the vehicles by owners
who added heavy campers or other special bodies to the trucks.
103. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492, § 109, 88
Stat. 1470, 1482 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1410(b) (1982)).
104. 120 CONG. REC. 30,838 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton); id. at 27,815 (remarks of Rep.
Wyman). See also id. at 27,809 (remarks of Rep. Frenzel) ("an exercise in big brotherism").
105. Id. at 27,816 (remarks of Rep. Wyman).
106. Id. at 30,841 (remarks of Sen. Cotton).
107. Id. at 27,820 (remarks of Rep. Rousselot).
Many other congressmen expressed their sentiments in equally strong terms. See, e.g., id. at 27,817
(remarks of Rep. Devine) ("I do not think the American people want bells ringing, whistles blowing,
and sirens going every time they sit down in a car"); id. (remarks of Rep. Collins) ("This buzzer is
something carried over from the Chinese torture system"); id. at 30,848 (remarks of Sen. Domenici)
("onerous restrictions ... which are so ridiculous that they become almost something one cannot live
with").
108. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 113, 80 Stat.
718, 726 (1966) (amended version at 15 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982)).
109. 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the government
could discharge its burden of establishing a defect simply by showing a
significant number of failures, without making any showing of their cause.
It did leave open the possibility that the manufacturer could avoid a find-
ing of defect by demonstrating, as an affirmative defense, not only that the
failures had resulted from owner abuse or neglect, but also that such
behavior was not foreseeable by the manufacturers.
The relaxed recall standard was further elaborated in another General
Motors case, United States v. General Motors Corp. (pitman arms).110 In
that case the government had introduced evidence in the district court that
a part of the steering linkage (the pitman arm) had failed on a 1959 Cad-
illac in one ninety degree turn at ten to fifteen miles per hour; that the
arms were made of metal somewhat softer than that usually employed to
withstand the stresses of low speed turns; and that General Motors had
sold six times as many pitman arm replacement units for its 1959 and
1960 Cadillacs as for the immediately preceding and succeeding years.
General Motors claimed that, notwithstanding these proofs, the govern-
ment had failed to demonstrate the existence of a defect creating an unrea-
sonable risk of injury or death. Indeed, there had been no reported inju-
ries from pitman arm failures, and General Motors had received no
complaints about the defect from any of its customers. Moreover, the
stress necessary to break the arms could only be applied at very low
speeds (as when parallel parking), and a risk analysis suggested that fail-
ures of pitman arms in the 1959 and 1960 Cadillacs left on the road
might produce, at most, two injuries before that model Cadillac
disappeared.
On the basis of these proofs the trial judge awarded summary judgment
to General Motors. The court ruled that the government had failed to
demonstrate an unreasonable risk of injury from failure of the pitman
arms and, therefore, had failed to demonstrate a defect in 1959 and 1960
Cadillacs. The court of appeals not only reversed the award of summary
judgment for General Motors, but directed that summary judgment be
granted to the government. The court held that in order to prove a defect
existed, NHTSA need only demonstrate (1) that there had been failures
in the equipment in apparently excessive numbers and (2) that this failure
would produce loss of steering control.11 General Motors' failure to dis-
prove either the possibility of failure in a driving situation or the conclu-
sion that such failure would produce loss of control of the car meant that
110. 561 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
111. Id. at 937.
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the condition of these components created an "unreasonable risk." Sum-
mary judgment for the government was therefore appropriate.1 12
The posture of the courts in recall cases contrasts strikingly with the
judicial posture assumed in regulation review proceedings. Courts have
given the Agency very modest responsibility to demonstrate that a signifi-
cant problem related to automobile safety is involved in a recall campaign.
One rarely finds the courts asking whether the safety problem underlying
the recall is sufficiently serious to justify the expense of repair or replace-
ment, or whether the Agency really knows enough to determine that the
recall will promote safety. General Motors can be required to offer to
replace the pitman arms in 40,000 seven-year-old Cadillacs in the face of
an uncontradicted projection that this replacement will prevent two inju-
ries. NHTSA may force the recall of General Motors trucks without any
knowledge of the cause of their failure, even when the only available evi-
dence suggests that their wheels do not fail when utilized in accordance
with the owner's manual. If offered to justify a regulatory wheel strength
requirement or a standard requiring increased durability in steering arms,
this sort of data and analysis surely would be laughed out of court.
Moreover, when NHTSA decides not to institute a recall, its decisions,
unlike those involved in revoking or suspending safety standards, seem
virtually immune from judicial review. For example, with respect to the
widely publicized problems with Ford transmissions, the Agency after ex-
tensive investigation decided not to find a defect related to automobile
safety. Instead it settled the proceeding with Ford by requiring that a
sticker be sent to owners of Ford automobiles indicating proper proce-
dures for ensuring that the automobile did not slip into reverse from park.
Ralph Nader's institutional offspring, the Center for Auto Safety, was
outraged by the NHTSA settlement. The Ford transmission problem was
neither limited in scope nor trivial in effect. The initial NHTSA investi-
gation had responded to twenty-three thousand complaints from owners
detailing situations in which their automobiles had slipped out of park
and rolled backward unexpectedly. A large number of injuries and deaths
resulting from Fords rolling backwards had also been documented.
112. Similarly, in United States v. Ford Motor Co., 453 F. Supp. 1240 (D.D.C. 1978), the gov-
ernment was permitted to find that a defect in Ford windshield wipers related to automobile safety
even though no reported accidents or injuries had resulted from the defect. The simple fact that the
windshield wipers might break off due to metal fatigue some time during the life of the automobile
was sufficient to establish that the automobiles contained a defect relating to automobile safety. Not-
withstanding the lack of any accidents or injuries, the court concluded (on the basis of expert evidence)
that a windshield wiper breaking off during a heavy downpour would create a dangerous situation or
"unreasonable risk" within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1)
(1982). 453 F. Supp. at 1248.
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However, both the district judge ruling on the Center's petition and the
D.C. Circuit on appeal11 found that the Secretary had not abused his
discretion in entering into the Ford settlement. The decision rested upon
the rationale that the Secretary must have the discretion to settle lawsuits
on such terms as he can negotiate because, like any litigant, the Secretary
in a recall proceeding faces the risk that litigation will prove unavailing.
That rationale makes perfect sense in most litigation contexts. One may
wonder, however, whether litigation risk was even perceptible in the Ford
case given the admitted facts and the Secretary's modest burden of proof
in recall litigation, as developed primarily by the D.C. Circuit itself. The
Secretary, after all, need prove only a significant number of failures in
order to establish a prima facie case of defect. There was certainly plenty
of evidence in the record to demonstrate that there was a significant risk of
injury or death when these failures occurred. To be sure, Ford argued
that the occurrences resulted from improper operation by owners. But on
that issue the General Motors (wheels) case puts the burden of proof on
manufacturers to demonstrate that this "abuse" by drivers was unfore-
seen. With twenty-three thousand documented complaints over nine model
years, Ford's chance of success in that enterprise makes buying lotto tick-
ets look like investing in Treasury bonds. 14
IV. Understanding Judicial "Review"
What is it about recall activity that calls forth this gentle judicial in-
quiry into the rationality of the Agency's case? And why do these gentle
courts become engines of reversal when presented with agency
regulations?
A. Explaining NHTSA's Experience
The institutional locus of decisionmaking, and the way a shift in loca-
tion affects legal expectations, may be the key to understanding why
NHTSA's recall litigation has produced results so different from judicial
review of its rulemaking. The posture of the Agency in defects enforce-
113. Center for Auto Safety v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
114. United States v. General Motors Corp. (X-car brakes), No. 83-2220 (D.D.C. Apr. 14,
1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-5170 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 1987), makes clear, however, that NHTSA
does not always win the defects lottery. While the Agency was permitted to establish a prima fade
case of "premature rear brake lock-up" in GM's 1980 X-body cars on the basis of consumer com-
plaints, its proofs were overwhelmed by engineering and controlled testing data. GM demonstrated
that its 1980 X-body cars had no greater braking problems than any other manufacturers' "peer
group" vehicles. Indeed, the proofs tended to show that the suspect vehicles were superior in braking
performance to the comparison vehicles. Slip op. at 46-47. Because, unlike any previous defects case,
there was no specific component failure alleged, the district court ruled that GM's proof of perform-
ance comparability (or superiority) negated NHTSA's circumstantial evidence of an "engineering" or
"performance" defect. Id. at 51-52.
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ment is that of a litigant seeking to enforce a statutory command. The
decisional institutions are Congress and the courts. According to the con-
ventional wisdom of administrative law, an agency in this posture loses
some of the customary deference paid to an expert decisionmaker sub-
jected to judicial review of its decisions. This may be correct. But lesser
deference to agency expertise hurts the agency's prospects for success in
court only if other factors affecting success remain constant. Instead, they
shift radically. Most importantly, we believe, the agency as litigant ceases
to be responsible for the overall soundness of its policy. The substantive
policy to recall defective cars is the legislature's. If procedural and eviden-
tiary policies-for example, questions of who bears what burdens of proof
and what evidence is essential to present a prima facie case-must be
developed, those issues are to be decided by the courts. This shift of re-
sponsibility for policy development from agency to legislature and court
may have several major effects on the psychology of judging-effects
which, taken together, tend to explain the remarkable generosity of the
defects jurisprudence.
First, any failure to protect automobile passengers from the effects of
defective automobiles NHTSA seeks to recall will in some substantial
sense be the responsibility of the court denying the Agency's recall peti-
tion. A risk-averse court will want to structure the evidentiary burden to
give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt. When denying a recall petition,
the court cannot console itself with the idea that it is remanding the case
to NHTSA for reconsideration, or that the Agency, not the court, is decid-
ing the substantive issue. To be sure, a finding of insufficient evidence
may in some cases "proceduralize" the courts' substantive judgments. But
the question that has been asked in defects litigation is really the prior
legal/policy question, "What level of proof should be sufficient in recall
enforcement proceedings?"
Second, the common law of product liability instructs courts to be risk
averse where product defects are concerned. The current state of the law
is quite straightforward: If people are injured because products fail in
their intended use (are defective), then the manufacturer is strictly liable.
Moreover, the history of the common law development of strict liability
reveals that the risk-distribution-compensation ethic undergirding prod-
ucts liability jurisprudence expresses one of the strongest normative com-
mitments of our legal culture."" The incremental strengthening of manu-
facturers' responsiblities and lessening of plaintiffs' burdens of proof that
115. See generally Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability, 14 J. LEG. STuD. 461 (1985)
(arguing that development of strict liability tort standard product of an intellectual movement in legal
scholarship).
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shaped the law into its present form demanded extraordinary and continu-
ous conceptual innovation. Time and again legal rules were twisted into
the doctrinal analog of a scrap heap, melted down, and poured into new
molds. This sort of lawmaking is undertaken by courts only rarely, and
only in the face of social needs that are perceived to be pressing. Defects
litigation is the regulatory analog of the product injury case.116
Third, the defects question is not framed as a technological, scientific,
or economic issue. The questions are straightforward and commonsensical.
Should people expect steering arms to break, wheels to collapse, or wind-
shield wipers to fly off? Obviously not. People expect cars and their com-
ponents to work. If they don't work, the car is defective. And if one can
imagine the relevant failure causing or exacerbating an accident, then that
defect surely relates to automobile safety.
Finally, the court in a defects case is being asked to give a limited rem-
edy in a limited context. The Ford transmission case aside, recalls tend to
involve a minuscule percentage of cars then on the road. Moreover, the
remedy only demands that manufacturers notify owners of the defect and
repair cars that are presented. Since owners decide for themselves whether
the reported defect is sufficiently serious to warrant the inconvenience of
presenting it for repair, the preferences and common sense of car owners
ameliorate any excessive caution in the judicial decree.
Defects litigation is thus particularistic and ordinary. It is not perceived
to have systemic consequences. The stakes are defined largely by the par-
ties' interests. Like any litigant, the Secretary may settle. Like any set of
beneficiaries, owners may choose whether or not to avail themselves of
their rights. And, as in any private litigation, the judge proceeds to shape
the law in the light of authority, history, social need, and the merits of
particular cases. Embedded in the legal culture of products liability litiga-
tion, all these considerations press defects litigation in the direction of
modest burdens of proof and expeditious judgment for the plaintiff.
Compare the psychology of recall litigation from the judge's seat with
the psychology of a rulemaking review proceeding from that same per-
spective. In rulemaking, the responsibility for regulatory implementation
is clearly the Agency's. The court's function is quite different. Its role is to
ensure the rule of law by keeping NHTSA within its statutory mandate.
The provision of judicial review is premised on the notion that the judici-
ary must guard against administrative failure, not product failure.
116. United States v. General Motors Corp. (X-car brakes), No. 83-2220 (D.D.C. Apr. 14,
1987), for example, relies explicitly on products liability decisions when determining the appropriate
weight to give circumstantial evidence of a vehicle defect. Slip op. at 60 n.52.
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Recall also that the general lesson of the legal system-at least that part
of our constitutional ideology concerned with administrative law-is that
delegation of policy choice to administrators is a reluctant necessity. 1 17
Delegation is justified primarily by the complexity of the regulatory tasks
assigned and the need for a high level of expertise. It is hardly remark-
able, then, that courts, discovering agencies operating on the basis of
hunches, speculations, and perceptions of political acceptability, are often
convinced that these administrators have failed to execute their legitimate
mandate. Fears of precisely these sorts of arbitrary and undemocratic ex-
ercises of power make delegations of administrative authority reluctant in
the first instance.
Moreover, our constitutional ideology posits that keeping administrators
within their delegated authority is an essential element of maintaining the
rule of law, the separation of powers, and ultimately our liberal, demo-
cratic polity. Viewed from this perspective, any loss of effectiveness in
substantive policy is thus but a small cost to pay in the crucial project of
maintaining our constitutional structure. Here again the legal culture
teaches courts to be risk averse, but risk averse about the processes of
governance.
These very general institutional considerations help explain why the
courts have taken rulemaking review seriously. But they do not tell us
why we find courts reshaping the issue of regulatory reasonableness into
an issue of process rationality, or why courts have jealously guarded rights
of notice and participation. We have argued that this "proceduralized"
form of judicial review is particularly debilitating from the agency's per-
spective. What cultural imperative has driven the courts in this direction?
In our view the demand for a rational decision process is the judiciary's
response to a massive dislocation in the legal culture-Congress' demand
that the courts decide general policy questions in a novel procedural con-
text. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, like most regu-
latory statutes adopted after 1966, permits immediate review of an agency
rule, or of the withdrawal or amendment of a rule, by any party who may
be adversely affected. Although superficially only a change in the usual
timing of review"' the consequences of this legislative innovation are
117. For two of many developments of this theme, see J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY
IN THE ADMINISTRAIIVE STATE (1978) (arguing that fair administrative procedure will supply legit-
imacy which agencies need to function efficiently); Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminis-
trative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (suggesting that current administrative process inade-
quately represents various interests).
118. One year after the enactment of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the Supreme Court
gave hesitant approval to the pre-enforcement review of agency regulations under the Administrative
Procedure Act. But it is far from obvious that many of the lawsuits contesting NHTSA's rules would
have been ripe for review without the specific statutory authorization provided by the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Compare Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (hold-
ing pre-enforcement review of FDA drug-labelling requirements justified given substantial impact of
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profound. Review in this form addresses not the particular circumstances
of a rule's application, but the abstract legality of its commands. Of
course, put in that way the issue is non-justiciable. The legal culture his-
torically maintains that courts declare the law only as a byproduct of the
adjudication of concrete controversies about the legal rights of particular
parties.119 Thus, in order to square the new congressional command to
decide in the abstract with the conventional judicial role, courts have been
required to identify a legal right that the legislature has called upon the
courts to protect. What could it be?
Repairing to the Administrative Procedure Act, Judge McGowan in
Auto Parts found that the plaintiffs' entitlement was to be free from "ar-
bitrary" exercises of administrative power.12 This traditional standard of
judicial review caused little difficulty when applied to specific agency deci-
sions to grant or deny a benefit or to impose a sanction. Decisions against
the preponderance of the evidence or contrary to customary policies are
arbitrary in the straightforward sense of "not according to law." But how
should this criterion be applied to general policies embodied in rules?
The task of translation is superficially simple, but, given our legal cul-
ture, profoundly transformative. By analogy to more discrete decisionmak-
ing, rules are arbitrary if they have no adequate factual predicate or if
they violate existing legal norms, in particular the statute pursuant to
which they were promulgated. So far so good; but let us now examine
these two grounds of arbitrariness. First conformity with the statute. The
Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires that rules "meet the need for motor
vehicle safety," protect against "unreasonable risk," be "practicable" and
"appropriate," and be stated in "objective" terms."' All the quoted terms
demand policy choices, not the application of legal rules.' Is the court
regulations on petitioners) with Toilet Goods Assoc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967) (holding pre-
enforcement review of FDA inspection procedures unnecessary, since injury to petitioners speculative).
As a reading of Auto Parts reveals, the parties to the case recognized the novelty of the issues and put
a wide variety of claims before the court. Judge McGowan was particularly troubled by the fact that
the plaintiffs were attempting to have the rule overturned on the basis of arguments that directly
contradicted the positions that they had taken in the rulemaking proceeding itself. Characterizing the
plaintiffs' position as "a soaringly expansive concept of the scope to be afforded on judicial review to a
participant in a rulemaking proceeding," and noting that the court found it "hard to take the petition-
ers seriously on this score" the court nevertheless addressed the issues. 407 F.2d at 342. While
unhappy with the plaintiffs' "effort to analogize themselves to private attorneys general with unlim-
ited right to expose all dangers to the public interest," the court seemed to believe that the judicial
review provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act demanded a judicial answer
on the merits. Id.
119. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must
of necessity expound and interpret the rule.
120. Auto Parts, 407 F.2d at 330.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391(1)-1391(2) (1982).
122. The Supreme Court has recognized that statutory interpretation, in the absence of a clear
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really to judge these questions? And, if so, how can it judge without ap-
pearing merely to be substituting its policy preferences for those of the
Agency, a role that our legal culture views as illegitimate?
The conventional lawyerly moves for separating law and policy, or for
camouflaging their inseparability, are unavailable to the courts in this
context. Claims that the court is addressing these broad issues as a neces-
sary aspect of narrowly-focused claims of right, or that these interpretive
issues have legal histories which constrain the judicial role, are simply
preposterous. To take the latter claim first, not only are the questions
novel, the norms put at issue are also designed precisely to confer policy
discretion on the administrator. The facts similarly belie the former claim.
The parties look more like legislative claimants than ordinary litigants.
They often are tangentially affected business interests,"'3 or ideological
champions of the left 2" or right. 2 5 Even the directly affected manufactur-
ers may be litigating for strategic competitive advantage rather than to
protect any conventional form of narrowly-focused property interest.'
And, no matter who is litigating, the judgment will bind everyone. The
litigants' "rights" and the "rights" of the public are indistinguishable. No
amount of scholarly celebration of this so-called "public law" litigation2 7
is likely to eliminate judicial anxiety in the face of a task that calls for
repeated, transparent, and general policy choice.'2 8 The task must be
indication of congressional intent, can involve choices of policy inappropriate for the legal branch.
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (refusing to overturn
EPA's definition of a "stationary source" under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977). In formu-
lating the doctrine of deference to an agency's interpretation of its own statute, the court explained
that:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. . . . The responsibility for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing
views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities
in the political branches."
Id. at 866 (citation omitted). See also Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 4 YALE J. ON
REc.. 283, 309 (1986) (commending Chevron court for forbidding federal courts from assuming over-
sight function with regard to administrative agencies).
123. Auto Parts; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
124. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
125. See, e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
126. Thus, for example, the Chrysler litigation to overturn the initial passive restraints rule in-
cludes as plaintiffs all the major automobile manufacturers except General Motors, who was well
ahead of its competitors in airbag development.
127. See, e.g., Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
128. Critics of such efforts are quick to point out the errors of the courts' ways. See, e.g., D.
HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SO:IAL POLICY (1977); Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social
Services?, 50 PuB. INTEREST 64 (1978).
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redefined to integrate it with a more modest conception of judicial
competence.
From this strategic perspective the other, "evidentiary" interpretation of
arbitrariness has much to recommend it. But here again the courts
encounter an awkward gap between their traditional reviewing functions
and the pre-enforcement review of rules. There are no obvious boundaries
on the rulemaking record, no accepted standards of "proof" for policy
judgments, and no procedural vehicles that define the "issues" in a
rulemaking proceeding. As Judge McGowan noted in Auto Parts, the
agency is engaged essentially in legislative activity, which in our legal sys-
tem may operate on the basis of any evidence that a majority is willing to
credit or even on no evidence at all.
Notwithstanding these obvious difficulties, evidentiary policing threat-
ens the cultural image of a court much less than outright policy revision.
Hence from Auto Parts forward courts have experimented with a series of
techniques designed to sharpen issues, reveal factual assumptions, and,
thereby, shape a record within which judicial review for factual adequacy
makes sense. This story of procedural innovation has been told else-
where,129 and we need not rehearse it in detail here. Our point is merely
that the need to integrate a novel judicial role into the accepted legal cul-
ture helps explain the use of the particular techniques that we have wit-
nessed in the review of NHTSA's rules.
Auto Parts creatively transformed the requirement of a "concise state-
ment of basis and purpose" into a demand for the presentation of a rule's
factual predicate and an explanation of why a particular policy choice was
made. These materials constituted a "record" from which the court could
judge means-ends rationality and, thereby, police for arbitrariness in its
traditional forms: the inadequacy of the record180 and inconsistent " ' or
incoherent " 2 decisionmaking. Of course, the agency's presentation of fac-
tual material might be incomplete. Thus the record had to be expanded to
include submissions of outsiders and the agency's responses to those sub-
missions. 8 Moreover, as the record grew in importance so did meaning-
ful opportunities to participate in its formulation through adequate
notice.'8"
129. See, e.g., DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L.
RE:v. 257 (1979) (examining criticisms of informal and "hybrid" rulemaking and suggesting alterna-
tive approaches for judicial review).
130. PACCAR; National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n. v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
131. Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
132. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 29.
133. Tire Retreaders, 491 F.2d at 31; PACCAR, 573 F.2d at 632.
134. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
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This proceduralized form of judicial review necessarily transforms the
image of rulemaking from a legislative-political endeavor into an analytic-
policymaking enterprise."' The judicial role is no longer to remake politi-
cal choices, but instead to examine agency reasons and agency choices in
the light of an appropriate factual record. This is, then, but a familiar
role in a new context. As the conventional reviewing court remands for
new trial upon the discovery of essential evidentiary gaps in the trial court
record, so the court reviewing administrative rules remands to the agency
for reconsideration when the record seems inadequate to support the
agency's choice. If this approach strongly reinforces the opposition tactic
we have called the "full court press," and severely burdens and delays the
rulemaking process, that is perhaps unfortunate. But it is surely consistent
with an adversary legal culture whose libertarian values have always ad-
vantaged defendants and the status quo.'
The translation of legislative-political questions into analytic-
policymaking issues through proceduralized judicial review, of course,
never really fools the sophisticated regulatory players. Judicial review for
process regularity was the opposition technique of "conservatives" con-
fronting the New Deal, and is currently the major bulwark of "liberals"
confronting the Reagan Administration's desire to deregulate." 7 Notwith-
standing proceduralism's penchant for the status quo, such political shifts
in some sense signal the legal culture's success in its aspiration to political
neutrality. Judicial review in a proceduralist form, like lead ballast, tends
to stabilize the ship of state whether the political winds blow from the left
or the right.
B. Assessing the "Legal Culture" Explanation
These speculations about the bases for judicial behavior in review and
enforcement proceedings are, of course, quite general. If accurate, they
should predict the patterns of judicial activity and agency response in
other regulatory domains as well. Do we find similar bi-polar patterns of
intervention and deference in the jurisprudence surrounding other federal
agencies with public health or safety missions and analogous regulatory
and enforcement powers? What has been the experience at the Food and
135. See generally Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV.
393 (1981) (arguing that incremental decisionmaking should be the norm except where irreparable
harm will ensue).
136. See generally Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'v REV. 95 (1974) (arguing that nature of legal system limits possibility of
redistribution).
137. See, e.g., Shapiro, APA: Past, Present and Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986) (arguing that
courts' demand of synoptic rationality in administrative decisionmaking reflects judicial preference for
status quo).
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Drug Administration (FDA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)?
Has judicial review there derailed rulemaking while facilitating a case by
case approach?
Answering these questions definitively is beyond the scope of this paper.
No one has studied any of the potentially comparable agencies with an
eye to addressing this issue systematically. The jurisprudence with respect
to each agency is substantial. More importantly, most of these agencies
have statutory missions, regulatory powers, institutional structures, and
substantive criteria for regulatory action that produce important non-
comparabilities.
Shep Melnick's important study of judicial review of EPA air quality
regulation,1"8 for example, finds quite serious problems with judicial
review of environmental policymaking. These problems of incapacitation
through inattention to dynamic or systemic effects and technological
naivete are surely reminiscent of judicial review of NHTSA's rulemaking.
But in scope, legal form, and institutional context, EPA air quality regu-
lation is strikingly different from NHTSA's regulation of automobile
safety. An air quality "standard" is more like a national goal than a rule
of conduct.1" Courts do not encounter specific equipment requirements
and lead times for compliance-legal commands comparable to federal
motor vehicle safety standards-until the enforcement stage. It is there, in
enforcement litigation, that "reasonableness" issues relating to state (but
often EPA-inspired) implementation plans and state or federal demands
on particular firms are usually "reviewed". For these and a host of other
reasons, direct comparison of EPA rulemaking and enforcement review
under the Clean Air Act with NHTSA's history pursuant to the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act would be quite misleading.
Other pervasive non-comparabilities beset analysis of the FAA, NRC,
FDA, and OSHA experiences. Alone among health and safety regulators,
the goals, regulatory presuppositions, and behavior of the CPSC hold out
tantalizing prospects for close comparisons of judicial review in that con-
text with judicial review of NHTSA. Like NHTSA, the CPSC is a con-
sumer product safety agency whose mandate was fashioned with close at-
tention to product safety as a public health issue. Like NHTSA, it was
launched with a primary emphasis on the preventive power of regulatory
standardization and technology-forcing. Like NHTSA, the CPSC's
138. S. MEI"NICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS (1983).
139. Id. at 44-49.
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rulemaking power has atrophied while its primary regulatory activity has
become product recalls.
Moreover, the box score for judicial review of rulemaking in the CPSC
context indicates that this Agency's rules and rulemaking processes have
received a spectacularly "hard look" from the judiciary. The Agency has
lost, in whole or in part, every reported case raising a rulemaking issue.140
The CPSC's judicial support in recall proceedings is, if possible, even
more striking than NHTSA's. Manufacturers seem from the beginning to
have been so certain of defeat should they oppose a recall request that
none has ever gone to court.
Closer analysis reveals, however, that these parallels are not nearly so
compelling as the simple recounting of wins, losses, and forfeits might
suggest. Review of CPSC product standards, rules similar in structure
and purpose to NHTSA's motor vehicle safety standards, has occurred
but twice.141 While these cases established quite demanding standards of
factual justification and comprehensive consideration for CPSC standard
setting, two cases do not provide overwhelming support for a conclusion
that the judicial attitude toward CPSC rulemaking is the exact analog of
the judicial approach to NHTSA's standards.
Nevertheless, the CPSC's ubiquitous excuse for its extremely modest
rulemaking output, and its sometimes bizarre safety priorities, certainly
resembles NHTSA's. Central to the CPSC's version of its regulatory col-
lapse is Section 10142 of its original Act. Section 10 permitted any person
to petition the CPSC for the promulgation of a product standard. More
importantly, unlike almost any other regulatory statute, Section 10 backed
these petitions by provision for judicial review of a CPSC denial. 4" As
petitions flooded in from consumers, competitors, state and local agencies,
or whomever, the CPSC felt obliged to develop a record with respect to
each that would withstand judicial review. This evidentiary burden gob-
bled up most of the Agency's standard-setting resources and, in effect, put
it out of the rulemaking business.'" Congress was convinced sufficiently
140. Aqua Slide-In Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978)
(voiding safety standard for swimming pools as unsupported by evidence); Dow Chemical, USA v.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 459 F. Supp. 378 (W.D. La. 1978) (challenge to interim regulation
for suspected carcinogens sustained); ASG Industries, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 593
F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (safety standard for wired glass suspended, remanded to agency for fur-
ther development of record).
141. Aqua Slide-In, 569 F.2d at 831; ASG Industries, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1323.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 2059 (1976).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 2059(e) (1976).
144. Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 195-96 (1976).
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by this story to amend the statute in 1981."' Yet, repeal of Section 10's
judicial review provision did not re-energize CPSC rulemaking. The rea-
sons for inaction in the 1980's are obscure. Perhaps the institutional die
had been irretrievably cast. The 1980's have certainly not been politically
hospitable to reforms that would awaken dormant regulatory powers at
the CPSC.
While the rulemaking review story at the CPSC looks something like
NHTSA's, closer attention to the CPSC's recall experience suggests that
the predicted judicial attitude to enforcement by the CPSC of a recall
order is probably irrelevant to the agency's behavior. 4" Recalls at the
CPSC are shaped by other strategic considerations. They seldom occur
except on the basis of manufacturers' own reports that products may be
defective. An agreement concerning the nature and extent of the recall is
then worked out in the shadow of two concerns: the manufacturer's need
to avoid a stream of damage actions and bad publicity, and the CPSC's
desire to avoid the formal hearings required by its statute should no
agreement be reached. 147 The resource demands of the formal hearings
requirement substantially lessen the CPSC's leverage, however generous
the courts might be in reviewing an eventual, contested, recall order. 48
Conclusion
The specific contribution of judicial review to the decline of consumer
health and safety rulemaking, whether at NHTSA or elsewhere, is diffi-
cult to establish with any precision. As we noted at the outset, whether we
have looked at Congress, the Executive Branch, the press, or inside
NHTSA, virtually every aspect of the Agency's environment seems to
have at least facilitated the shift from rules to recalls. But surely we must
credit to some degree the statements of regulatory participants that the
negative impact of judicial review has been substantial. The retreat from
regulation in the 1980's may be massively overdetermined by political and
145. Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1210, 95 Stat. 703
(1981) (repealing 15 U.S.C. § 2059 (1976)). For a description of the Commission's informal compli-
ance system see Merrill, CPSC Regulation of Cancer Risks and Consumer Products: 1972-1981, 67
VA. L. REV. 1261, 1296-1310 (1981).
146. Merrill, supra note 145, at 1283 n.116.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(0 (1982).
148. Moreover, it is not obvious that the courts would be as generous to the CPSC in enforcement
proceedings as they have been to NHTSA. The CPSC lost the only seizure case that it pressed to
decision and since then has settled all other seizure proceedings. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v.
Anaconda Co., 593 F.2d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (denying seizure on the ground that allegedly defec-
tive electrical wiring not a "consumer product"). But here, unlike in rulemaking, judicial reluctance to
support the Agency may have modest practical effects. No product proceeded against as an imminent
hazard has remained on the market. Presumably some combination of consumer aversion, liability
fears, and loss of goodwill adds force to the CPSC's modest legal leverage.
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economic factors, but NHTSA's, as well as the CPSC's, experience pre-
dates the Reagan Administration. Indeed, the major events in the
NHTSA story were complete as of 1975. And the retreat from regulation
as standard-setting does not include a corresponding retreat from recalls,
the judicially-favored regulatory mechanism.
In the NHTSA context, and perhaps elsewhere, it is very hard to ex-
plain this judicial posture as oriented toward maximizing the benefits and
minimizing the costs of vehicle safety regulation, at least as measured in
public health terms. The most authoritative studies indicate that vehicle
failures are the probable cause of only thirteen percent of accidents, and
most of these failures are attributable to poor owner maintenance.14'
Therefore recalls can, at best, be operating on but a small fraction of the
vehicle safety problem. Because returns for repair range from only forty to
sixty percent,150 recalls could be preventing only seven percent of accidents
if every recalled vehicle were defective, every defect sure to cause an acci-
dent, and every repair faultless.
The surely negligible effect of recalls on vehicle safety is underscored by
NHTSA's steadfast failure to study the question. Since some vehicles are
repaired and some not, while all have subsequent accident histories, the
Agency has a perfect environment for studying the safety effects of recalls.
Yet to our knowledge, no portion of NHTSA's research budget has ever
been allocated to discovering the safety effects of recalls. We do not argue
that it should be. The effects are surely negligible, as systematic study of
the similarly oriented state vehicle inspection programs suggests.1 5 By
contrast the best, although very imperfect, studies of the effects of
NHTSA's modest standard-setting suggest an overall improvement in ve-
hicle safety of around thirty percent.' 52 That is on the order of twenty
thousand lives and one hundred thousand serious injuries per year.
From this public health perspective, judicial review is obviously backing
the wrong horse. But, of course, the courts are not in the business of judg-
ing the social desirability of regulatory activity, the "reasonableness" crite-
rion for substantive review notwithstanding. They are judging, ostensibly,
whether there has been compliance with the law.
We believe the courts' actual behavior accords with their ostensible role.
149. INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN PUBLIC SAFETY, TRI-LEVEL STUDY OF THE CAUSES OF Ac-
CIDENTS 7-9, 18-23 (1979) (study prepared by private consulting group for NHTSA).
150. Data on the recall completion rate for the period 1966 to 1981 were provided by NHTSA
officials. See also Tobin, supra note 21, at 293-94 (suggesting that approximately 40% of recalled
vehicles never repaired); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE AUTO SAFETY PROBLEM: IDENTIFY-
ING DEFECTS AND RECALLING DEFECTIVE VEHICLES 5-6 (1975) (reporting recall response rates
from 34% to 60%).
151. W. CRAIN, VEHICLE SAFETY INSPECTION SYSTEMS: How EFFECTIVE? (1980).
152. REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE, supra note 9, at 55, 69.
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When the legal culture accepted federal and state regulation in the 1930's,
it accepted regulation substantially different in kind from that practiced
by NHTSA. It accepted specific legislative rearrangement of entitlements
and the creation of administrative adjudicatory bodies to determine the
reasonableness of commercial conduct. 15  The courts' acquiescence in the
legislative redistribution was the acceptance of the logic of democratic gov-
ernance; the allowance of agency adjudication was the recognition that
adjudicatory due process could exist in nonjudicial institutions. Large-
scale rearrangement of entitlements by general rules, promulgated by ap-
pointive agencies having vague mandates, was not necessarily a part of the
New Deal's realignment of legal icons. Such actions are supported by
neither the ideology of democracy nor the ideology of adjudicatory justice.
To be sure, the "expertise" of administrators was much touted by
Progressives and featured in many deferential judicial opinions. But so
long as the process of decision remained adjudicatory, "fairness," at least
"due process," supported the agency's exercise of power.154 As agencies
moved into rulemaking or standard-setting in a pure form, this prop of
adjudicatory legitimacy was lost. Attempts to reconstitute it by thoroughly
judicializing the rulemaking process have failed,1 55 and, if successful,
would probably have destroyed the very rulemaking capacity that they
sought to legitimate. 5 Expertise was left to stand alone.
Although we have argued that "rational process" review evolved in re-
sponse to the judiciary's need to maintain its own legitimacy by operating
in accordance with generally accepted norms, we might as easily have ar-
gued that, in the traditional common law fashion, the courts have bor-
rowed their standards of expertise from the agencies' aspirations. If the
legitimacy of agency edicts were to be premised on their application of
systematic technical intelligence to the problems in their charge, then
courts would do their best to see whether the agencies behaved in an ex-
153. See generally Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1259-61 (1986) (discussing Supreme Court's abrupt "reversal of opinion" on constitutionality of ad-
ministrative agencies in 1937).
154. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), one of the two cases
invalidating New Deal legislation on grounds that it contained an improper delegation of legislative
authority to an administrator, makes this distinction explicit. The Supreme Court distinguished the
Federal Trade Commission mandate-to police for "unfair competition"-from the President's power
under Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act to approve industry codes of "fair competi-
tion," on the ground that the FTC's activities had to be carried out through formal adjudication. 295
U.S. at 533.
155. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
156. For extensive discussion see Gifford, Administrative Rulemaking and Judicial Review: Some
Conceptual Models, 65 MINN. L. REV. 63 (1980); Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The A.P.A., the D.C.
Circuit, and The Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345 (1979); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the
Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978).
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pert fashion. Only then could it be said that they were operating accord-
ing to law.
This process has striking parallels to the development of products lia-
bility law. Faced with new technologies and forms of business organiza-
tion which generated both new risks and new forms of social and eco-
nomic organization, courts responded by imposing strict liability on
manufacturers of defective products. This imposition was thought to be
both distributively just in a risk-spreading sense, and also just from the
internal standpoint of the new forms of enterprise that had emerged. The
systematic elimination of errors or defects, including errors or defects that
increase injury, is after all the highest aspiration of a technical-
bureaucratic mode of production. The law based liability on the manufac-
turers' own implicit values, notwithstanding the recognition that action in
accordance with those values could never be completely assured.
Commentators have criticized the courts for transposing this aspira-
tional standard to judicial review; for succumbing to the intellectual ap-
peal of comprehensive or synoptic rationality as a legitimating paradigm
for administrative regulation."' 7 They have urged that courts recognize the
impossibility of such a decision process and the necessity of "muddling
through" as a dynamic decisional technique where events unfold in real
time, under uncertainty and in the face of resource constraints. But these
arguments are radically incomplete.
They are incomplete first because the judicary has not required system-
atically that agencies, including NHTSA, make bulletproof decisions. The
bureaucratic aspiration to comprehensive rationality is tempered both in
doctrinal announcement and in practice by an appreciation of reality.15
The courts seem to be searching instead for an "agency standard" some-
what analogous to the "industry standard" in products liability cases: A
product or a rule will be defective only if it fails to meet the expectations
engendered by good agency practice. As Judge McGowan's formulation of
the standard of review in Auto Parts indicates, courts are looking for ac-
tion that limits the dangers of irrationality, not for rational perfection.
We have argued here that even this more modest standard of judicial
review is potentially disabling. It invites overcorrection within the bureau-
cracy to eliminate the inevitable legal uncertainty that arises from the
courts' promise to judge reasonableness reasonably. Unless there are pow-
erful forces driving agency risk-taking, paralysis will result.
157. See, e.g., Diver, supra note 135, at 434; see also Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assess-
ments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301
(1981).
158. See the discussion in Gifford, Rulemaking and Rulemaking Review: Struggling Toward a
New Paradigm, 32 ADMIN. L. REv. 577, 598-603 (1980).
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The argument for judicial modesty is also incomplete because it fails to
articulate a normative standard for "acceptable muddling through" that
has reasonably predictable consequences. This failure is not surprising.
The "muddling through" idea is a descriptive heuristic. Transformed into
a normative concept it is itself a muddle. Every final decision has a his-
tory. Within that history concrete choices are always explicable. If we
know enough about the concrete events, "It seemed like a good idea at the
time," is almost always plausible. If that were good "muddling," judicial
review would police only for bad faith or fraud.
Perhaps that is what the critics have in mind. Such a reduction in the
judicial presence in regulatory affairs, however, has demonstrably not
been sanctioned by the political process. Judged by the specific statutory
provisions for judicial review that Congress adopts, and by the proposals it
debates for general reform of judicial review of administrative action,
there is no substantial constituency out there for reduction or elimination
of judical review. Eclectic, uninformed and disabling as it may be, Con-
gress, and perhaps the electorate, seem to want the legal culture, as inter-
preted and applied by reviewing courts and the private and public actors
who look to them for guidance, to form a part of the regulatory
environment.
Our study of vehicle safety regulation reveals that this preference or
instinct is deeply conservative. The revolutionary reconceptualization of
regulatory technique and of the vehicle safety problem represented by the
1966 Motor Vehicle Safety Act has failed to produce the major public
health advances that were predicted. The core of the revolutionary
enterprise-standard-setting to force technological advances in vehicle
safety-has been abandoned. One, and we reemphasize only one, of the
factors influencing that outcome has undoubtedly been NHTSA's experi-
ence in court.
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